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"You're a petty bourgeois[.]"...
"Is that good or bad?"
"Pretty bad, but not incurable. We liquidate you, then we proletari-
anize you."'
Of all the words which may be used to designate any sort of ten-
ant, the word we heard used least frequently ... by... all local human
beings white or black, save only new dealers, communists, and various
casts of liberal, was the word sharecropper.
In the north, however... sharecropper has.., become the ge-
neric term[,] ... and... absorbed every corruptive odor of inverted
snobbery, marxian, journalistic, jewish, and liberal logomachia, emo-
tional blackmail, negrophilia, belated transference, penis-envy, gyneco-
logical flurry and fairly good will which the several hundred thousand
least habitable and scrupulous minds of this peculiarly psychotic quar-
ter of the continent can supply to it: and it is one of the words a careful
man will be watchful of, and by whose use ...he may take clear
* B.A., 1966, University of Chicago; M.A., 1971, Ph.D., 1973, Princeton University; J.D.,
1983, Harvard University. Attorney, Farm Worker Division, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., Weslaco,
Texas.
The following attorneys shared their insights on sharecropping and sharecropper litigation:
Jeannie Barrett, Mike Blank, Benjamin Chinni, Peter Dellinger, Leonard Grossman, Mary Lee Hall,
William Hoerger, Rick Kessler, Janice Morgan, and Melvyn Silver.
1. E. RICE, IMPERIAL CITY 225 (1937).
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measure of the nature ... of the enemy. 2
I. IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD-BUT ONLY THE WORD
Once upon a time there was a system of commodity production3
that arose on Southern cotton plantations during the upheaval following
the Civil War.4 In order to retain control over the emancipated slaves
and their labor, plantation owners adopted the institution of sharecrop-
ping.5 This relationship of production, which assumed various forms,
depending on whether the workers furnished their labor only or also
other inputs such as seed or draft animals,6 declined precipitously in the
wake of the socioeconomic transformation associated with the New Deal
agricultural programs and the advance of mechanized cotton picking af-
ter World War II.7 But predictions of its demise were premature. For
2. J. AGEE & W. EVANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMOUS MEN 455-56 (1960).
3. See Friedland, Commodity Systems Analysis: An Approach to the Sociology of Agriculture, 1
REs. IN RURAL SOC. & DEV. 221 (1984); see also W. FRIEDLAND, MANUFACTURING GREEN
GOLD: CAPITAL, LABOR, AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE LETTUCE INDUSTRY (1981); R. THOMAS,
CITIZENSHIP, GENDER AND WORK: SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE
(1985).
4. Sharecropping or m6tayage in Europe and elsewhere antedated its advent in the American
South. See, e.g., 2 DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 738 (R.H. Inglis Palgrave ed. 1898); E.
WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN 126-27 (1976); D. KERTZER, FAMILY LIFE IN CENTRAL
ITALY, 1880-1910: SHARECROPPING, WAGE LABOR, AND CORESIDENCE (1984). For an example
of its potentially complicated character in the contemporary Third World, see C. GEERTZ, AGRI-
CULTURAL INVOLUTION 99 (1974).
5. Zeichner, The Transition from Slave to Free Agricultural Labor in the Southern States, 13
AGRIC. HIST. 22, 30 (1939). Theoretical economists have recently tended to view sharecropping in
the South between the Civil War and World War I as a market-oriented rational mechanism for
sharing risks and providing incentives. See, e.g., Reid, Sharecropping as an Understandable Market
Response: The Post-Bellum South, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 106 (1973); Reid, Sharecropping in History and
Theory, 49 AGRIC. HIST. 426 (1975); Reid, The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited-Again, 85 J.
POL. ECON. 403 (1977); Stiglitz, Sharecropping, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 320 (J. Eatwell ed. 1987). Historians, by contrast, have emphasized the coercive
macrosocial context in which sharecropping arose and developed. See, e.g., D. GRUBBS, CRY FROM
THE COTTON: THE SOUTHERN TENANT FARMERS' UNION AND THE NEW DEAL 15 (1971); J.
MANDLE, THE ROOTS OF BLACK POVERTY: THE SOUTHERN PLANTATION ECONOMY AFTER THE
CIVIL WAR (1978); V. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890, at 59-73 (1947); J, WIL-
LIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-
1877, at 126-36 (1965). But see R. DAVIS, GOOD AND FAITHFUL LABOR: FROM SLAVERY TO
SHARECROPPING IN THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT, 1860-1890 (1982); R. RANSOM & R. SUTCH, ONE
KIND OF FREEDOM: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EMANCIPATION 66-77, 87-99 (1977)
(although planters did not initiate sharecropping, the system promoted their interests). On the ra-
cially, economically, socially, and politically oppressive character of the plantation sharecropping
system during the New Deal period when such labor was excluded from the burgeoning federal
social-protective legislative scheme, see Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987). See also Biggest Cotton Plan.
tation, FORTUNE, Mar. 1937, at 125; Nelson, Welfare Capitalism on a Mississippi Plantation in the
Great Depression, 50 J. S. HIST. 225 (1984).
6. See R. RANSOM & R. SUTCH, supra note 5, at 92 (table 5.5).
7. P. DANIEL, BREAKING THE LAND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF COTTON, TOBACCO, AND
[Vol. 25:195
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SHARECROPPING
some wicked Midwestern pickle princes9 liked the sound of the word
"sharecropper" so much that they decided to rescue it from the undead
and to confer it upon their Hispanic migrant pickers. This article is
about that metempsychosis.
So-called sharecropping has, at various times, embraced pickles in
Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Carolina, Texas, Colo-
rado, and California; cherries in Michigan; and strawberries, cabbage,
peppers, raspberries, blackberries, string beans, and snow peas in Califor-
nia. 11 Although some Michigan pickle farmers have claimed that the
practice antedates World War II,11 one grower who was sued in 1976
conceded that eight or nine years earlier he had paid the very same mi-
grants hourly wages as employees.12 Some growers seek to infuse their
position with the fervor of a Weltanschauung. Thus Jerry Brandel, a
leading Michigan pickle grower and eponymous defendant in a crucial
case discussed below, opined that "'it's the civil rights of the families to
work and train their kids at their own discretion ... ." " He has also
opaquely analogized the initiative he seeks to inculcate in migrant
RICE CULTURES SINCE 1880 (1985); C. JOHNSON, E. EMBREE & W. ALEXANDER, THE COLLAPSE
OF COTTON TENANCY (1935); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 259-261 (1944); H. RICHARDS, COTTON AND THE AAA 135-62 (1936); J.
STREET, THE NEW REVOLUTION IN THE COTTON ECONOMY: MECHANIZATION AND CONSE-
QUENCES (1957); T. WOOFTER & A. FISHER, THE PLANTATION SOUTH TODAY (1940); Burford,
The Federal Cotton Program and Farm Labor Force Adjustments, 33 S. ECON. J. 223 (1966); Daniel,
The Transformation of the Rural South: 1930 to the Present, 55 AGRIC. HIST. 231 (1981); Day, The
Economics of Technological Change and the Demise of the Sharecropper, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 427
(1967); Holcomb, Wage Laborers Versus Sharecroppers, 23 THE AGRIC. SITUATION, Oct. 1939, at
13; Kirby, The Transformation of Southern Plantations, c. 1920-1960, 57 AGRIC. HIST. 257 (1983);
Wage Workers and Sharecroppers on Mississippi Plantations, 49 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1104 (1939);
Whatley, Labor for the Picking: The New Deal in the South, 43 J. ECON. HIST. 905 (1983).
8. The number of white croppers declined from 383,381 in 1930 to 47,650 in 1959; the corre-
sponding figures for blacks were 392,897 and 73,387 respectively. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970, ser. K 135 & K 141, at 465 (1975). In 1959 the Bureau of the Census stopped classifying
croppers separately "[b]ecause of the decreasing importance of the cropper system in the South." Id.
at 453.
9. Michigan has been the largest producer of pickling cucumbers for decades. See U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1949, at 258 (1949) (table 313); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1972, at 208 (1972) (table 251); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICUL-
TURAL STATISTICS 1988, at 158 (1988) (table 216).
10. Hager, Legal Challenge Before Court to Test 'Sharefarming' Concept, L.A. Times, Oct. 30,
1988, pt. I, at 38, col. 1; Echenique, Children Work in Local Berry Fields, Salinas Californian, Aug.
30, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
11. U.S. Suit Tests Cucumber Harvest Tradition, Booth News Service, dateline Hart, Mich.
(undated news clipping) (copy in author's possession).
12. Affidavit of Robert Eilers, Marshall v. Eilers, No. G76-562-CA6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2,
1983); Plaintiff's Reply Brief to Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at
3, Eliers (No. G76-552-CA6).
13. US. Suit Tests Cucumber Harvest Tradition, supra note 11.
1989]
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farmworkers to the (pre-perestroika) Soviet practice of permitting collec-
tive peasants to farm privately on small plots.1 4
Pseudo-sharecropping is merely one variant of a wider trend toward
paper conversions of employees into independent contractors. The coin-
cidence that farmers had been paying pickle pickers about fifty percent of
the price that they received from processors served as a convenient pre-
text for calling the employment relationship "sharecropping"-though
historical precedent from Southern cotton farming would have supported
other divisions of income as well. 5 But such contingencies are superflu-
ous. For imaginative cotton farmers in West Texas for years paid their
cotton hoers the sub-minimum wage of $2.50 per hour merely by calling
them independent contractors. Sugar beet farmers in Wyoming and Ne-
braska have done the same with their piece-rate workers. 6
Although it would be intellectually satisfying to demonstrate some
inherent economic or socio-technological basis for the proliferation of
sharecropping in pickles precisely in the 1970s and 1980s, no stringent
explanation is forthcoming.17 While it is part and parcel of a widespread
trend to reclassify employees as self-employed entrepreneurs in order to
avoid employment taxes,' 8 neither the economics of the industry19 nor
14. Telephone interview with Jerry Brandel (1987).
15. See, e.g., G. MYRDAL, supra note 7, at 237; R. RANSOM & R. SuTcH, supra note 5, at 92
(table 5.5); R. Shlomowitz, The Transition from Slave to Freedman: Labor Arrangements in South-
ern Agriculture, 1865-1870, at 40-55 (1979) (unpublished dissertation, Univ. Chi.).
16. Thus the conclusion to be drawn from the fact that a farmer may treat the same workers as
sharecroppers when they pick pickles but as employees when they harvest tomatoes is not that
sharefarming is not a subterfuge designed to avoid paying employment taxes and the minimum
wage. See, eg., Marshall v. Brandel, No. G76-393-CA6, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 1983).
The use of non-sharecropping independent contracting in other crops has rendered the more blatant
sham unnecessary.
17. Wells, Legal Conflict and Class Structure: The Independent Contractor-Employee Contro-
versy in California Agriculture, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 49, 53, 76 n.25 (1987), argues that the
"technoeconomic constraints" on mechanization are the common ground for sharecropping in
strawberries and pickles. Apart from the circularity of the argument-mechanization would obvi-
ously preclude hand-harvesting and any plausible claim that non-owning workers on expensive ma-
chines were anything but employees-the argument fails to explain why sharecropping has not
spread to other hand-harvested crops. Moreover, because sharecropping is just a word, it is rela-
tively trivial whether this scam or the run-of-the mill independent contracting scam is used.
18. See Linder & Norton, The Employee-as-Contractor Dodge, The Philadelphia Inquirer, June
15, 1987, at 15-A; Linder & Norton, The Latest in Employer Scams, The Texas Observer, Aug. 28,
1987, at 12. On the parallel phenomenon in Britain, see Report of the Committee of Inquiry Under
Phelps Brown into Certain Matters Concerning Labour in Building and Civil Engineering, 17 Par].
Papers para. 393-412, at 141-46 (Cmnd. 3714, 1967-68). See also R. BELOUs, THE CONTINGENT
ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE
(1989).
19. Neither the labor intensity, import intensity, capital substitutability, nor demand elasticity
associated with pickles appears to single them out for sharecropping. See generally C. NUCKTON,
DEMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR CALIFORNIA TREE FRUITS, GRAPES, AND NUTS: A REVIEW OF
[Vol. 25:195
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any unique natural characteristics of the commodity can explain the cus-
tom. And while there is some evidence that sharecropping was intro-
duced by strawberry farmers in California to ward off organizing efforts
by the United Farm Workers (UFW),2° in the Midwest, some cucumber
growers who treat their pickers as sharecroppers have recognized and
collectively bargained with their union, the Farm Labor Organizing
Committee (FLOC).21
Astonishingly, the metastasis of the sham has witnessed the creation
of strange bedfellows as some Marxist sociologists have taken it seriously
as part of an alleged recrudescence of the petty bourgeoisie.22 Indeed,
whereas Marx identified as the sharecropper's distinguishing characteris-
tic that his claim to part of the product rested not on his being a worker,
but rather "his own capitalist," that is, an owner of part of the means of
production,23 the epigones have gone so far as to assert that:
"[S]harecropping is undergoing a revival in the vegetable fields of Cali-
fornia as landowners and processors invite workers to assume more re-
sponsibility for the quality of production in the interest of 'flexibility.'
There proletarians are being transformed into petty commodity produ-
cers." 24 By way of contrast, a non-Marxist economic theorist who has
recently proposed the systemic conversion of private fixed-wage con-
tracts into revenue-sharing contracts between firms and workers in order
PAST STUDIES (1978); C. NUCKTON, DEMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR VEGETABLES: A REVIEW OF
PAST STUDIES (1980); B. PRICE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MECHANIZATION IN U.S. AGRI-
CULTURE (1983); UNIV. CALIF. AGRIC. ISSUES CENTER, MARKETING CALIFORNIA SPECIALTY
CROPS: WORLDWIDE COMPETITION AND CONSTRAINTS (1987).
20. See Section V infra pp. 229-56.
21. If agriculture were covered by the NLRA, these growers would not be obligated to recog-
nize a union of self-employed workers. See Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage Under the
National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors,
and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. L. REV. (forthcoming 1989). The self-employed are ex-
cluded from the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, CAL. LAB. CODE, § 1140.4(b)
(Vest Supp. 1989).
22. See, e.g., Steinmetz & Wright, The Fall and Rise of the Petty Bourgeoisie: Changing Pat-
terns of Self-Employment in the Postwar United States, 94 AM. J. Soc. 973 (1989). But see Hagel-
stange, Niedergang oder Renaissance der Selbstdndigen? Statistische Daten zur Entwicklung in der
EG und in Nordamerika, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIOLOGIE 143 (1988) (relative shares of the nonde-
pendent economically active population have continued to decline in the United States and Euro-
pean Community); Linder & Houghton, Steinmetz and Wright on Self-Employment and the Petty
Bourgeoisie, 95 AM. J. Soc. (forthcoming 1990).
23. 3:2 K. MARX, DAS KAPITAL 337 (1894). Bechhofer & Elliott, Petty Property: The Survival
of a Moral Economy, in THE PETITE BOURGEOISIE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE UNEASY
STRATUM 182 (1981), also emphasize the importance of property ownership. Inconsistently and
bizarrely, James Mill took the position that the capitalist owned the laborer and the product (i.e.,
that wage labor equals slavery), and that the capitalist bought the laborer's share in advance. J.
MILL, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (3d ed. 1826), reprinted in J. MILL, SELECTED ECO-
NOMIC WRITINGS 219, 228-29 (D. Winch ed. 1966).
24. Wilson, The Political Economy of Contract Farming, 18 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 47, 56
1989]
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to eliminate stagflation and unemployment, expressly acknowledges the
continued existence of capital-labor relations.
II. EVEN REAL SHARECROPPERS MAY BE EMPLOYEES
In analyzing the sharecropping movement and cases, it is necessary
to bear in mind that so long as farmworkers were excluded from virtually
all protective legislation,26 the fifty-fifty compensation scheme was obvi-
ously not designed to avoid employer obligations because none existed.
It was only when some farmers began to become subject to social security
tax obligations in the early 1950s, 2 1 but especially federal minimum
wages in 1966, and unemployment insurance taxes, and workers' com-
pensation premiums in some states in the 1970s and 1980s, that farmers
developed an economic incentive to devise schemes to avoid these costs
of doing business. Thus in places, such as parts of Michigan, where fifty-
fifty arrangements may have antedated these financial impositions, it is
possible that sharecropping had become a trade custom to which farmers
had grown so accustomed or even wedded that their attachment to it was
at first the product of inertia and only later assumed a less innocent col-
oration. In other areas, however, where farmers did not introduce share-
cropping until after they had felt the impact of their new statutory
obligations, a presumption of unlawful original intent is more plausible.
When Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act28 in 1966 to
(1986). Wilson relies on Wells, who has reproduced this claim in several formats: Wells, The Resur-
gence of Sharecropping: Historical Anomaly or Political Strategy? 90 AM. J. Soc. I (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping]; Wells, What is a Worker?, The Role of Sharecroppers in
Contemporary Class Structure, 13 POL. & Soc'Y 295 (1984) [hereinafter Wells, What is a Worker?];
Wells, Sharecropping in the United States: A Political Economy Perspective, in FARM WORK AND
FIELDWORK 211 (M. Chibnik ed. 1987) [hereinafter Wells, Sharecropping in the United States];
Wells, supra note 17, at 49. At the same time Wilson contends that farmers who contract with
processors for the output of their crops are "petty commodity producers... being transformed into
'semi-proletarians.'" Wilson, supra note 24, at 56. Bizarrely, then, pickle pickers would be self-
employed and pickle farmers employees.
25. M. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY: CONQUERING STAGFLATION (1984).
26. "[I]t is... probable that the New Deal's rejection of agricultural labor is at the root of the
farm workers' Rechtlosigkeit." R. Lyon, The Legal Status of American and Mexican Migratory
Farm Labor 118 (1954) (unpublished dissertation, Cornell Univ.). See generally Linder, supra note
5.
27. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1206, § 205(a), 68 Stat. 1091 (1954).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). Had sharecroppers been held to be employees and had agri-
cultural workers been included in the FLSA in the 1930s, compulsory payment of even 15 to 20
cents per hour would have shaken the foundations of the plantation. Indeed, testimony before Con-
gress in 1945 indicated that, if the exemption were eliminated, sharecropping "would be completely
revolutionized and would have to go on an absolute cash basis ...." Proposed Amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 694
(1945) (statement of Charles Holman, Secretary, Nat'l Cooperative Milk Producers).
[Vol. 25:195
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incorporate some farmworkers into minimum-wage coverage, it directly
addressed the issue of sharecroppers:
It is intended that the minimum wage provisions of the Act be
extended to certain sharecroppers and tenant farmers. The test of cov-
erage for these persons will be the same test that is applied to deter-
mine whether any other person is an employee or not.... Coverage is
intended in the case of certain so-called sharecroppers or tenants
whose work activities are closely guided by the landowner or his agent.
These individuals, called sharecroppers and tenants, are employees by
another name. Their work is closely directed; discretion is nonexis-
tent. True independent-contractor sharecroppers or tenant farmers
will not be covered; they are not employees.29
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) then adopted these directions al-
most verbatim in its interpretative bulletin.3" That in fact many so-called
sharecroppers would be entitled to the minimum wage emerged from the
hearings held before the House Rules Committee. When asked about
this issue by Representative Martin, Representative Dent cited the
above-quoted passage and the following colloquy ensued:
Mr. Dent. Where they do their own selection of work-they are
truly in contractual agreement with an employer, and they are not em-
ployees of that farmer.
Mr. Martin. The owner of the farm has control as to when the
crop is planted and harvested. It is traditional in this country that
many of these people work on a percentage of the crop itself.
Mr. Dent. Where they work on a contract, I believe the law is not
clear-and there have never been any problems on it to date.
Mr. Martin. Yes. But you haven't gone into agricultural cover-
age under fair labor standards before. I think you are opening up a
very serious problem. It is going to be difficult to determine.
Mr. Dent. Well, I am hoping it doesn't create the trouble. 3 1
The issue arose again on the floor of the House when Representative
Watts of Kentucky, in the course of describing his own personal situation
as a tobacco farmer vis-a-vis his three sharecroppers, inquired whether
he would be responsible for paying the minimum wage if at the end of the
year the tobacco burned up: "If so, it is an atrocious situation."32 To
allay his fears, Representative Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem cited the
committee report:
29. H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1966).
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 780.330(a) (1988).
31. Minimum Wage: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Rules on H.R. 13,712, pt. II, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966).
32. 112 CONG. REC. 11,623 (1966).
1989]
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Testimony indicates that there are large numbers of so-called
sharecroppers who are not allowed to make a single economic decision
regarding the land upon which they live and work. For example, they
do not decide what to plant, when to plant, when to harvest, where to
purchase seed, or where to sell the product of their labor. For these
people, the term "sharecropping" only denotes a means of compensa-
tion; it conveys no connotation of independence, individualism, or self-
determination. On the other hand, there are true tenant farmers, who
make basic economic decisions up [sic] which rest the productivity of
the farm and consequently the amount of their compensation. Gener-
ally these tenants operate farms owned by absentee landlords. They
are unsupervised, make day-to-day decisions necessary to the running
of the farm, and share in the profits related to the productivity, for
which they are greatly responsible. Such persons are not intended to
be covered by the Act.3 3
Even this degree of explication did not satisfy Representative Watts, who
wondered about the consequences of a retired farmer's telling his tenant
which field to plow or which crop to grow on the basis of his greater
knowledge of the land.34 Although he appeared somewhat relieved to
hear Representative Dent tell him that the controlling elements were
"whether there is day-by-day supervision . . . and whether you would
make the decision on the sales in conjunction with him or whether you
would make the decision as to which fields to plant... ," Representative
Watts insisted on an answer to his question about whether he was re-
sponsible if the crop was destroyed. At this point Representative Dent
appears to have become flustered,3 5 for his reply was irrelevant:
Mr. Dent. That is absolutely not even within the realm of remote
possibility. If you are working in an office with a contract for a year's
retainer and the office bums down, the owner does not have to pay
you, does he? If a fellow does not open up again, he does not have to
pay it, does he?
Mr. Watts. No. But under the bill there is a provision he shall
receive the minimum wage for the time he put in.
Mr. Dent. He is then an independent contractor under those
conditions.
36
At this point Adam Clayton Powell intervened again, this time to
33. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1366, supra note 29, at 31).
34. 112 CONG. REC. 11,623 (1966).
35. Representative Dent prejudiced the issue by his claim that if the farmer "has seven share-
croppers, he would not be giving the kind of directions that would be considered to be daily supervi-
sion." Id. at 11,624. This is just as false when applied to a classical cotton plantation as it would be
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praise Representative Watts for having raised an "excellent" point,
which was "exactly correct" and behind which the committee stood.
Since Watts had merely asked questions, the only point to which Powell
could sensibly have been referring was the absolute obligation to pay the
minimum wage. This surmise is strengthened by the rest of the dialogue
in which Watts acknowledged that: "I can see that the purpose of cover-
ing the sharecropper was probably to keep somebody from ducking out
from under the law and claiming so-and-so was a sharecropper. That
may have been what was in the committee's mind. But... I hope... it
is not the intention of this Congress or of this committee that the share-
cropper could then say, 'I am sorry it burned, old buddy, but I have put
in so many hours, and you have to pay me.'" To which Powell again
ambiguously replied: "That position I subscribe to."37
In the Senate, it was Cooper of Kentucky who played foil to Yarbor-
ough of Texas. Horrified by the thought that a farmer might have to
supplement the wages of a sharecropper (or a sharecropper's employee) if
they fell below the minimum wage of $1.00 per hour, Senator Cooper
inquired whether it would be necessary to determine the sharecropper's
status on a case by case basis. The populist senator, who was the prime
mover of the bill in the Senate, replied that a sharecropper would not be
an employee under the kinds of arrangements that prevailed where he
had grown up in Texas. But significantly the cotton sharecropping
agreements Yarborough had in mind involved the tenant's furnishing
tools, horses, mules, tractors, and food.38
The year following the enactment of inclusion of farmworkers under
minimum-wage protection, the House Agriculture Committee devoted
an entire hearing to the question of sharecropper coverage.39 In the
course of questioning the Assistant Secretary of Labor and the Wage and
Hour Administrator, the chair, Representative Poage of Texas, and Rep-
resentative Abernethy of Mississippi repeatedly expressed their agree-
ment that a sharecropper who provided only labor-who, for example,
merely chopped cotton or harvested sugarcane-would be an employee.
Indeed, Poage went so far as to state that:
I never heard of that. I will go farther than you did and say that no-
body in my country ever rented a piece of land to somebody else and
said that they would give him one-half or any part of it if he would just
37. Id.
38. Id. at 20,620-21.
39. The Application of Minimum Wages in Agriculture: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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do the chopping and the harvesting. Who planted the land? How did
the land get planted-who plowed it? Who cultivated it? Who paid for
these items? I never heard of a contract like that which did not require
more of a renter than that. Possibly such contracts exist, but surely
they are exceptional.4°
When pressed, informants at the United States Department of Agricul-
ture admitted that such arrangements were not typical.4 1 After agreeing
with the DOL officials once again that a labor-only sharecropper would
be an employee, the chairman asked them whether "it [would] take the
curse off if the landlord makes him pay one-half the cost of the insecti-
cides." To this the Assistant Secretary replied that it would not necessar-
ily so long as the tenant had no opportunity to exercise judgment and
foresight or for profit and loss.42 When Representative Poage insisted
that a tenant could "come out the loser" or "make a profit without put-
ting out any money,"43 the Assistant Secretary sought to explain "[t]he
whole basic philosophy ... of the free enterprise system":
When a man opens a shoeshine parlor, or a peanut stand, he takes the
risk-he puts his money and his own initiative and imagination and
courage which makes it either work or fail. If this tenant or this em-
ployee... does nothing more for the landowner than to go out and
hire employees to come in and pick the cotton or the tobacco,
whatever it may be, he is an employee, in our opinion. He is not an
independent contractor.
Mr. Abernethy. Nobody disagrees with that statement. 44
But when Chairman Poage began to hedge and pointedly asked whether
the economic reality test factors controlled or whether the mere fact that
a worker provided labor only was itself dispositive, the Wage and Hour
Administrator maintained that Congress had intended the latter.45
The history of sharecropping in the South belies the claims that la-
bor-only sharecroppers were atypical.46 At the outset "[i]n return for his
labor the former slave received or kept a part of the crop, depending
upon whether he was a cropper or a tenant.",47 Although both received
40. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 11-12.
45. Id. at 13.
46. Indeed, as capital investment increases, sharecropping has been viewed as an inherently
unstable arrangement destined to give way to outright land rental or a wage system. Stiglitz, Itcen-
tives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 219, 251 (1974).
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advances of food and clothing, even at that time, when a worker merely
supplied his labor and was controlled by the landlord, he was a cropper,
that is, an employee receiving as wages a share of the crop.48 Because a
sharecropper was prohibited by law from disposing of the crop until it
had been divided and the landlord had set aside a portion as wages,4 9
disputes arose as to whether the cropper was to receive wages in kind
(dividing the crop) or in money (if the proceeds were divided).5 0 Even
where the sharecropper supplied all the labor, part or all of the seed and
fertilizer, and bore all or part of the cost of marketing, and received a
share of the crop, he often still worked under close supervision.5' More-
over, especially after 1900, sharecropping became a form of piece-rate
wage labor and ceased being true tenancy.52 "Croppers, the most depen-
dent of all tenants, are little more than wage hands."53 "In reality, the
sharecropper was little more than a wage hand being paid in kind ....
Essentially, it was a form of debt peonage." 4 By the post-World War I
period, most black sharecroppers had "practically no voice in deciding
what crops to grow, or what methods to follow in cultivation. 55 Thus it
was "only by an ironic travesty" that Southern sharecroppers were clas-
sified as entrepreneurs. 6
By the 1930s, nine-tenths of black plantation tenants "[we]re just
ordinary laborers" under supervision.
Their wages, however, are not determined according to supply and de-
mand in a free labor market.... Nor is the sharecropping agreement
modeled after the ordinary piece-wage system .... The wages of the
sharecroppers and share tenants... vary in such a way that there is no
48. Id. at 414, 416.
49. Id. at 419.
50. Woodman, Post-Civil War Southern Agriculture and the Law, AGRIC. HIsT. 319, 324-27
(1979).
51. C. BRANNEN, RELATION OF LAND TENURE TO PLANTATION ORGANIZATION 30 (1928);
Brooks, The Agrarian Revolution in Georgia, 1865-1912, 3 BULL. OF THE U. Wis. 393, 440 (1914)
("At the present time, an unsupervised 'cropper' ... is almost never met with. The supervision of his
operations is as close as the planter can make it ....").
52. G. WRIGHT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COTTON SOUTH 162-63, 176-79 (1978).
53. A. RAPER, PREFACE TO PEASANTRY 148-49 (1936). See also R. SCOTT & J. SHOALMIRE,
THE PUBLIC CAREER OF CULLY A. COBB: A STUDY IN AGRICULTURAL LEADERSHIP 206 (1973).
54. D. CONRAD, THE FORGOTTEN FARMERS: THE STORY OF SHARECROPPERS IN THE NEW
DEAL 7 (1965). See also P. DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH 1901-
1969, at 20, 24 (1972); Brandt, Fallacious Census Terminology and its Consequences in Agriculture, 5
SOC. RES. 19, 24-28 (1938). J. AGEE & W. EVANS, supra note 2, evoke indelible images of the lives
of tenants and sharecroppers in Alabama during the New Deal.
55. D. ALEXANDER, THE ARKANSAS PLANTATION, 1920-1942, at 66 (1943). See generally,
Linder, supra note 5, at 1346-48.
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reason whatever to assume that they... would satisfy the supply-and-
demand equations of an ordinary free labor market.... As a labor or
tenant contract, the share tenant agreement reveals its pre-capitalistic
character by the fact that the wage... is not fixed in a sum of money
or product but in a proportion which remains fixed as a matter of tradi-
tion independent of how prices and price relations change. The prod-
ucts and cost factors in the production other than labor are, however,
priced in the market and so is land. Only labor costs (and incomes) are
fixed in an arbitrary and traditional proportion. This indicates the de-
pendent status of labor in this economic system. Labor has not even
had the protection of being directly related to the objective conditions
of price formation in an economic market.57
In his massive study of blacks in the United States, Gunnar Myrdal
observed that: "While in other parts of our economic system it has been
the accepted ideal that risk of investment should be directly correlated
with the size of investment, the sharecropper and the share tenant-
although nothing but laborers from economic and social viewpoints-
have to carry a considerable share of the entrepreneur's risk."58 To be
sure, the sense in which Myrdal used "risk" is Pickwickian; for although
it was true that the share tenant shared in the benefit of a good crop and
did not have much capital of his own, "he may find himself having in-
vested a full season's work without having received anything near the
wages he would have earned had he been a wage laborer with full em-
ployment.... That certainly is a business risk just as much as any."59
The sharecropper had most of the disadvantages of being an independent
entrepreneur without any of the rights. Thus, for example-like today's
pickle picker-he had to take the landlord's word for the price obtained
for the cotton.6" And more importantly, the sharecropper's "auton-
omy"-like that of the pickle picker-consisted in large part in his abil-
ity to make full use of his family's labor.6
During World War II, the United States Bureau of the Census, in
comparing the data collected on sharecroppers since 1920, observed that:
57. G. MYRDAL, supra note 7, at 245 & n.b (emphasis in original). Because of the similarity in
status to wage laborers, attempts were made to include croppers, even though they were considered
self-employed, in the social security bill in 1935. Alston & Ferrie, Labor Costs, Paternalism, and
Loyalty in Southern Agriculture: A Constraint on the Growth of the Welfare State, 45 J ECON. HIST.
95, 107-15 (1985).
58. G. MYRDAL, supra note 7, at 245.
59. G. MYRDAL, supra note 7, at 246.
60. G. MYRDAL, supra note 7, at 246.
61. G. WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH 94 (1986). According to Vance, Human Factors in
the South's Agricultural Readjustment, I LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259, 272 (1934), the success of
the cotton plantations rested on the unpaid labor of women and children.
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Most sharecroppers work under close supervision, and the land
assigned each cropper by his landlord is often merely a part of a larger
agricultural enterprise operated as a single working unit in respect to a
central farm headquarters, to the control of labor, and to the manage-
rial and supervisory functions.62
Capturing the quasi-feudal character of the relationship, the Bureau ad-
ded that "[i]n many instances, the croppers or tenants and their families
are also wage hands on the 'home farm' of the plantation. '63 The anal-
ogy to the serfs' duties on the medieval manorial demesne is difficult to
overlook.64
Throughout the postbellum period, sharecroppers were considered
wage laborers in many jurisdictions. This classification created, to be
sure, an ambiguous legal status; for while it entitled croppers to protec-
tion under the lien laws, it also subjected them to the oppressive entice-
ment laws that the plantation oligarchy enacted in the wake of
emancipation. 65
Sharecroppers and tenants of Southern plantations in general were
62. [3 Agriculture: General Report] BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, at 136 (1943).
63. Id.
64. See A. RAPER & I. REID, SHARECROPPERS ALL! 26 (1941); R. VANCE, FARMERS WITH-
OUT LAND 7 (1937); R. VANCE, THE NEGRO AGRICULTURAL WORKER UNDER THE FEDERAL
REHABILITATION PROGRAM 126 (1934); G. WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 91.
65. But see Barron v. Collins, 49 Ga. 581 (1873), in which it was held that no enticement action
lay where the enticee was a sharecropper, who was a contractor and not a servant of the landowner;
accord Burgess v. Carpenter, 2 S.C. 7 (1870). This view did not generally accord with the economic
realities of Southern sharecropping and was repudiated by statute and state supreme court rulings in
a number of Southern states. See, eg., Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601 (1871); Haskins v. Royster, 70
N.C. 601 (1874). See generally H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
450-77 (1877). For the later development, see Barnhardt v. State, 169 Ark. 567, 275 S.W. 909
(1925); Jones v. Dowling, 12 La. App. 362, 125 So. 478 (La. Ct. App. 1929); Powers v. Wheless, 193
S.C. 364, 9 S.E.2d 129 (1940); Loveless v. Gilliam, 70 S.C. 391, 50 S.E. 9 (1905); McCutchin v.
Taylor, 79 Tenn. 259, 261 (1883); Cry v. J.W. Bass Hardware, 273 S.W. 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925);
Clark v. Harry, 182 Va. 410, 29 S.E.2d 231 (1944); GA. CODE § 61-501 (1933); Book, A Note on the
Legal Status of Share-Tenants and Share-Croppers in the South, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 539
(1937); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 62; C. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
TENANT FARMER IN THE SOUTHEAST (1952); 17 AM. JUR. Crops § 45, at 237 (1938). In conform-
ity with case law, the Arkansas Bureau of Labor and Statistics accepted Statements of Claims for
Wages from cotton sharecroppers in the 1930s; see, e.g., Claim of Joe Pirani (Dec. 23, 1937), repro-
duced in SOUTHERN TENANT FARMERS UNION, PAPERS, 1934-1970 (microfilm reel no. 5). See also
Social Security Amendments of 1955: Hearings on H.R. 7225 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1956) (statement of Senator George: "[I]n Georgia it has always been held
that the relation of landowner and sharecropper was one of employer and employee."). The courts
in many Northern states took the same position. See, e.g., Kelly v. Rummerfield, 117 Wis. 620, 623,
94 N.W. 649, 650 (1903). In Alabama sharecroppers were generally recognized to be tenants. See
ALA. CODE tit. 31, § 23 (1940). The decisions in Mississippi were in conflict. Compare Schlicht v.




Linder: Petty-Bourgeois Pickle Pickers: An Agricultural Labor-Law Hoax Co
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
subjected to a unique type of local-regional political socioeconomic sub-
jugation. Whatever the forms and sources of their disempowerment, to-
day's migrant farmworkers fall outside of that historical regime.66
Similarly, whatever power they may exercise, Michigan pickle farmers
are not the structural or functional homologues of pre-World War II
Mississippi planters. Yet by the same token, certain aspects of the
master-servant relationship in the narrow sense that is pertinent to mod-
em labor-protective legislation are common to both; and if real labor-
only or other closely supervised sharecropping cotton pickers were suffi-
ciently heteronomous to qualify as employees,67 then a fortiori in-name-
only sharefarming piece-rate pickle pickers must be too.
III. MIDWESTERN METEMPSYCHOSIS: SEM-ANTICS IN ACTION
The first case in which the issue of sharecropping appears to have
been litigated in the context of a modem protective labor statute was
Sachs v. United States.68 The dispute did not take place directly between
a farmer and farmworkers, but rather between the former and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service over payment of Federal Insurance Contributions
Act (FICA) taxes. Mr. and Mrs. Sachs employed migrants to cultivate
and harvest sugar beets, tomatoes, and pickling cucumbers on their
eight-hundred-acre farm in northwestern Ohio in 1971. Mr. Sachs re-
cruited them in Texas as he had in the past and paid their travel expenses
to Ohio. He paid them by the hour for cultivating sugar beets and toma-
toes; by the piece for harvesting tomatoes; and by half the receipts for the
cucumbers. With the exception of hoes, Sachs furnished all the tools and
materials and "informed them of the proper way to pick tomatoes and
cucumbers."6 9 Whereas Sachs treated the payments for the tomato and
sugar beet work as wages and paid FICA taxes on them, he treated the
workers as "share farmers" with respect to the cucumber work and did
not withhold any FICA taxes. After being assessed FICA taxes, penal-
ties, and interest, Sachs not only protested but also filed for a refund on
66. Labor-only black tenant-sharecroppers in tobacco in areas such as eastern North Carolina
represent the vestiges of that historical system. Telephone interview with Mary Lee Hall, attorney,
Farmworker Legal Services of North Carolina (May 1989).
67. Undoubtedly it is true that: "[i]mportant differences must be pointed out between the situa-
tion in which the Negro paid a share of the crop as rent and that in which he received a share as a
wage for his labor." V. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890, at 64 (1947). Neverthe-
less, even closely supervised tenants on whom the planter successfully imposed some risk in the form
of a fixed rent might evince sufficient indicia of dependent employment.
68. 422 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
69. Id. at 1093.
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the employment taxes paid for the tomato and sugar beet compensation
on the ground that the latter was made to the family heads qua self-
employed crew leaders under 26 U.S.C. § 3121(o). After paying the as-
sessment and filing a claim for refund, which was disallowed, Sachs
sued.70
He alleged that 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(16) excepted from the definition
of covered employment the relationship of a farm owner to a share
farmer, who was responsible for self-employment taxes pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 1402(c)(2)(B). Yet curiously, the parties agreed that the mi-
grants were common-law employees.71 In order to prevail, the farmer
had to show that all three elements of § 3121(b)(16) were met:
service performed by an individual under an arrangement with the
owner or tenant of land pursuant to which-
(A) such individual undertakes to produce agricultural... com-
modities... on such land,
(B) the agricultural... commodities produced by such individ-
ual, or the proceeds therefrom, are to be divided between such individ-
ual and such owner or tenant, and
(C) the amount of such individual's share depends on the amount
of the agricultural ... commodities produced.
The court ruled that criteria (B) and (C) were clearly met, noting that the
IRS did not argue otherwise.7 2 It is unclear why the IRS acquiesced in
these arguments. Strictly understood, subsection (C) manifestly was in-
tended as an indicium of risk-taking: whereas an employer owes wages to
an employee regardless of whether the employer can sell the commodities
produced by the employee, a share farmer is presumed to share the im-
mediate risks of non-sale. Yet there was no evidence that these-or any
other-pickle pickers ever assumed or were deemed by the farmer to
have assumed such a risk. Moreover, the judge made matters too easy
for himself by failing to go behind the alleged fifty-fifty agreement to
determine whether it was merely a form of piece-wage.73 Be that as it
may, the case ultimately turned on the meaning of the phrase "under-
takes to produce." The IRS interpreted it as meaning that the workers
assumed the responsibility for performing substantially all the physical
70. Id. at 1094.
71. Id. at 1095.
72. Id.
73. During the social security hearings of 1955, Senator Kerr opined that agricultural piece-
rate workers-receiving five cents per quart of strawberries for example-were labor contractors
rather than employees. Social Security Amendments of 1955: Hearings on H.R. 7225 Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1956).
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labor from the inception to harvesting of the crop.74 Although the court
acknowledged that the workers did not meet this requirement, it found
the statutory language sufficiently ambiguous to warrant recourse to the
legislative history. Congress added subsection (b)(16) in 1956 in order
to dispel doubt as to the intent of the Congress since persons who oper-
ate farms under a share-farming arrangement with the owner or tenant
have some characteristics of employees and some characteristics of
self-employed persons. For example, in some instances the landowner
may direct the share farmer to nearly the same extent, on an overall
basis, as he does individuals who clearly are employees. On the other
hand, share farmers participate directly in the risk of farming; their
return from the undertaking is dependent upon the amount of the crop
... produced. The provisions of the bill would remove any doubt as to
whether the services performed by the share farmer are rendered as an
employee or as a self-employed person by statutorily defining such
services to be self-employment. This definition is believed to be consis-
tent with the actual relationships existing under share-farming ar-
rangements in the majority of cases.75
Although the court was surely right in holding that "Congress intended
to place the emphasis on the risk sharing element,"' 76 it completely
missed the point in ruling that Sachs' "exercise of the degree of control
over the direction of the migrants is not dispositive. ' ,77 For as Judge
Walinski himself inadvertently remarked, the threshold issue is whether
the persons in question "operate" a farm. 78 The court made no such
finding and it would be preposterous to assert that the migrants who
merely trained the vines and picked the pickles were in any way operat-
ing Sachs' farm.
Although the court was also correct in stating that Congress in-
tended to give statutory effect to the relevant interpretation that the IRS
had offered the year before the amendment was enacted, once again the
court clearly erred in failing to see that the fact situation depicted in
Revenue Ruling 55-538 7 differed crucially from that of the migrant
pickers. Among the facts set forth in the Revenue Ruling indicating that
an entirely different socioeconomic situation prevailed there was that the
farmer makes available a house as a residence at which "[e]ach share-
74. Sachs, 422 F. Supp. at 1095.
75. S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S, CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3877, 3883-84 (emphasis added).
76. Sachs, 422 F. Supp. at 1096.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 1955-2 C.B. 313.
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farmer is offered the use of a garden plot and is allowed to keep livestock
and poultry on his premises." With regard to the costs and risk of pro-
duction, the share-farmer "agrees to pay a proportionate share of the
costs of the fertilizer and insecticides" and enters into an agreement with
the owner as to the types and locations of crops grown.80 Referring only
to the similarities between the two-in particular to the element of con-
trol, which it had just characterized as not dispositive-the court then
grossly distorted the record by asserting that "[t]he remaining terms of
the agreement were substantially similar to the arrangement between Mr.
Sachs and the migrant workers ... ,'81 On this basis, the court then held
the cucumber harvesters to be share farmers. 82
With regard to Sachs' claim that the family heads were crew leaders
and that the family members cultivating sugar beets and harvesting to-
matoes were, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3121(o), employees of their fathers
or spouses, the court, adopting an economically realistic position, ruled
that the heads were not crew leaders. Judge Walinski held that the fa-
thers did not fit the Internal Revenue Code definition of a crew leader
inasmuch as they could not be said to "recruit" their own children and
wives-rather Mr. Sachs performed that task.83 Moreover, the court
read this part of the crew leader test in pari materia with the Farm Labor
Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2042(b), which excluded from
contractor status those who furnished only family members.8 4
While the IRS decided not to appeal the decision concerning share-
cropping," Sachs appealed the crew leader issue. The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed in an unpublished opinion.8 6 The Ohio Bureau of Employment
Services relied on Sachs in determining that service performed by such
sharecroppers was self-employment and thus not covered employment
80. Id.
81. Sachs, 422 F. Supp. at 1096.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1097. The Senate Report stated that crew leaders "recruit crews of workers." S.
Rep. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3888.
Sachs argued on appeal that it was "in the national interest" for him to travel to Texas to hire. Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellant at 12, Sachs (No. 77-3128).
84. Sachs, 422 F. Supp. at 1098.
85. The IRS decided that "[b]ecause this issue is widespread and of some administrative impor-
tance due to the potential for large revenue loss, we believe the Service should continue to litigate
this issue. However, we are ... doubtful as to the chance of prevailing on appeal. It appears more
prudent to develop another case .... Action on decision, 1977-87 (May 20, 1977).
86. Sachs v. United States, No. 77-3128 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1979).
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for state unemployment compensation purposes. s7 In 1985, partly at the
urging of the migrant farmworker attorneys;88 the IRS issued a new reve-
nue ruling,8 9 announcing its disagreement with Sachs.90  Emphasizing
that operating a farm is the threshold issue, the IRS noted that:
The typical share farmer has responsibility for a wide range of farming
activities, including participation in the initial planning for the opera-
tion, and incurs out-of-pocket business-related expenses.... On the
other hand, the migrant workers ... are hired to perform only specific
tasks. They do not undertake to produce the crop and they incur no
business expenses. They are not operators of the farm merely because
they perform certain tasks relating to the cultivation and harvest of the
cucumber crop.
91
Perversely, the IRS has failed to enforce its own Ruling. Consequently,
although "sharecroppers" are relieved of liability for self-employment so-
cial security taxes, the IRS does not seek to collect the employer's share
of the FICA tax from the farmers.92
Several years later Judge Walinski, given the opportunity to revisit
the issue of pickle sharecropping under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) in a factual setting "very similar to" Sachs, this time would "not
allow form to triumph over substance."93 In granting the DOL's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of whether the pickle pickers were
employees in a child labor case, the court ruled that Sachs had no prece-
dential value because the statutory purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code differed from those underlying the FLSA. Because the former
served to collect taxes and the latter to eliminate low wages, a worker's
87. Interoffice communication from A. Walter, Assistant Unemployment Compensation Direc-
tor, Contributions, to D. Russell, Chief, Contribution Dep't, and J. Hardway, Chief, Compliance
Dep't (Mar. 20, 1978) (copy in author's possession).
88. The author participated in a meeting with the Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Examina-
tion) in January 1985.
89. In the interim the IRS prefigured this position in a number of private rulings. E.g., Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 78-21-013 (Feb. 21, 1978); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-26-062 (Mar. 30, 1978); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-50-
009 (Aug. 23, 1983).
90. Rev. Rul. 85-85, 1985-1 C.B. 332, 333.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-50-024 (Aug. 25, 1981) (in which the IRS held that the pickle
pickers were employees but that the farmer met the safe haven requirements of § 530, triggering tax
relief). See Linder, The Involuntary Conversion of Employees into Self-Employed: The Internal Rev-
enue Service and Section 530, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 14 (1988). In a memorandum dated Feb.
20, 1985, and sent to all regional commissioners (copy in author's possession), making reference to
the proposed Revenue Ruling that was later promulgated as Rev. Rul. 85-85, 1985-1 C.B. 332, 333,
the IRS changed its position with regard to § 530. Nevertheless, at the regional collection level, the
IRS inconsistently accepts amended returns from pickle pickers, in which they contend that the
Form-1099 was issued erroneously and that they are tendering offer of the employee's share of the
FICA tax, without seeking the employer's share from the farmers.
93. Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 159, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
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status could vary from statute to statute. Because Judge Walinski had
found in Sachs that the migrants were employees under the common law
but nevertheless sharecroppers for purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code, 94 it was illogical for him to have considered that case "irrelevant
and inapposite."95 Because the facts were the same and the FLSA eco-
nomic realities test of employment the same as that developed in the
cases cited by the Sachs court,96 Sachs was stare decisis.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded through the economic reality test
factors: control, opportunity for profit or loss, investment, permanency,
and skill.97 In order to apply these factors properly, the court made the
following fact findings: The farmer owned or rented all the land and all
the expensive mechanical equipment, including tractors, cultivator, plow
sprayers and irrigation system. The farmer decided when to plow and
when and where to plant and cultivate cucumber crops, paid for the seed,
decided whether to use, applied, and paid for fertilizer, pesticide and in-
secticide. All of this activity preceded the migrants' arrival. They, on
the other hand, were housed by the farmer at his expense. They worked
on other crops than pickles and provided no tools except hoes. They had
no control over the price of the pickles or any say in the choice of a
buyer.98 On this basis the court found "overwhelming control" by the
farmer, who had significant investment, and no investment by the un-
skilled workers. Of potentially greatest significance were twin findings
concerning profit and loss. Because the workers "exercise[d] no en-
trepreneurial discretion whatsoever," higher piece wages achieved
through working faster or more could not be bootstrapped into "profit."
By the same token, the migrants assumed no risk of loss because "they
have not invested anything in which to lose": "If the pickle crop is bad,
the loss incurred by the migrant would be a loss in terms of opportunities
to pick pickles. However, this loss translates into a loss of wages, and not
a loss of profit." 99
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the farmer's appeal on the ground that
94. Id. at 160.
95. Id.
96. On the overruling of the judicially created economic realities test in the social security
setting by the Gearhart Amendment in 1948, see M. LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAV: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ch. 6 (1989).
97. The court omitted the vital factor of integration into the alleged employer's business.
98. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. at 161.
99. Id. at 162.
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it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of an order that was not fi-
nal.1° While this litigation was in progress, the DOL was also prosecut-
ing pickle farmers in the Western District of Michigan for violations of
the child labor and record-keeping provisions of the FLSA. In two com-
panion cases decided in 1983, the court there set the stage for renewed
review by the Sixth Circuit by holding that the pickle pickers were not
employees and that therefore the farmers had not illegally employed chil-
dren. '0 The following year the court of appeals in the closely
watched" 2 Brandel case furnished the first solid judicial support for
sharecropping, which, in the event, represented the high-water mark in
the efforts by farmers to persuade the courts that unskilled and capital-
less workers are not employees.
In seeking to understand how the court came to condone this prac-
tice, it is important to keep in mind that the evidentiary record was con-
fused by the intervention of nine migrants who had been induced by the
defendant-farmer to proclaim their status as independent contractors. 0 3
Relevant and related, too, is the fact that Brandel was not presented as a
minimum-wage case involving extreme and outrageous exploitation.
Thus, the trial judge stated that "it might just as likely be said that
Brandel is economically dependent upon the harvesters. There is no in-
dication that these harvesters are in need of the protection of the Act.
They work neither long hours nor earn low wages."' 4 Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit not only accepted this finding, but asserted that the workers had
earned "the equivalent of $6.00-$9.00 per hour."' ° In point of fact,
however, the record-keeping violations committed by the defendant
made it unclear whether such hourly wages were not in reality earned by
100. Donovan v. Gillmor, 708 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1982).
101. Marshall v. Brandel, No. G76-393-CA6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 1983); Marshall v. Eilers,
No. G76-562-CA6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 1983).
102. See, e.g., Sinclair, Calling Migrants 'Sharecroppers' to Skirt Laws Faces Court Test, Wash-
ington Post, May 22, 1982, at A20, col. 1; Appeals Court Upholds Legality of 'Share-Cropped' Pickle
Harvest, Great Lakes Vegetable Growers News, July 1984, at 1, col. 1; Herald-Journal (Grand
Rapids), March 12, 1981, at 4, col. I. Gillmor had also received some local coverage. See, e.g.,
Judge Rules Labor Act Includes Farm Workers, The Blade (Toledo), Apr. 9, 1982 at -, col. -;
Farm Workers Denied Benefits, Group Charges, The Blade (Toledo), June 3, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
103. Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D. 670 (W.D. Mich. 1980). Such perverse intervention by pro-
tected workers in cases brought by the DOL is not unique. See, e.g., Marshall v. CB Sports, Inc.,
No. 79-299 (D. Vt. filed Dec. 4, 1979) (homeknitters).
104. Marshall v. Brandel, No. G76-393-CA6, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 1983).
105. Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1120 n.10 (6th Cir. 1984).
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a whole family."0 6 Moreover, the DOL committed a tactical error in fail-
ing to raise the issue on appeal of whether the children were Brandel's
employees regardless of the relationship between their parents and
Brandel. For when the DOL belatedly raised the issue in its petition for
rehearing,1"7 Brandel weakly responded that he had never "asserted that
the children of the migrants are each individually, independent contrac-
tors .... Each child is, simply, solely, and realistically, a member of his
or her family functioning within the family environment." 10 8 The court
ruled, without prejudice, that the issue had been raised inappropri-
ately. 0 9 A final weakness in the Brandel litigation lies in the fact that
the DOL did not argue that because Congress intended the FLSA to
protect even some real Southern sharecroppers, a fortiori sham share-
croppers were covered.110
Astonishingly, despite the virtually identical fundamental structural
relationships in both cases, just as the court in Gillmor found that every
economic-reality-test factor pointed towards an employer-employee rela-
tionship, the Sixth Circuit found that no factor supported such a finding
in Brandel. The essential facts as found by the lower court and adopted
by the Sixth Circuit were as follows. Although the court mentioned in
passing in a footnote that Brandel's contracts "required that all harvest-
ing be done by family members," ' t it never reflected on the extraordi-
nary character of such an invasive restriction on the entrepreneurial
freedom of the putative independent contractors. For if Brandel was per-
mitted to impose the biological limits of family size on the migrants' abil-
ity to exploit labor, he was in effect making it virtually impossible for the
migrants ever to accumulate sufficient capital to climb the "agricultural
106. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en Bane on Behalf of the Secretary of
Labor at 14 n.9, Donovan v. Brandel, 760 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-1228).
107. Id. at 2 n.3.
10S. Appellee's Response to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en
Banc at 7, Brandel (No. 83-1228).
109. Brandel, 760 F.2d at 126.
110. The Brief of Amicus Curiae Farm Labor Organizing Committee on the petition for rehear-
ing to the Sixth Circuit alluded to, but did not develop, this issue. Brief at 19, Brandel (No. 83-
1228). Because the amici concentrated their efforts on showing the vast historical differences be-
tween cotton sharecroppers and pickle pickers in order to divest the word "sharecropper" of any
legal relevance to the migrants, they could no longer plausibly marshal the arguments that inferred
the latter's employee status from the former's. Id. at 13-17.
11. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1116 n.4. Sharecropping contracts run the gamut from the naive to
the crude. Thus Steffens Brothers Orchards in Grand Rapids, Michigan, used one (in Spanish) in
the 1980s that stated that the owners employed "el peon" and provided for withholding for social
security. Copy of agreement used by Steffens Brothers Orchard (in author's possession). Even the
more sophisticated versions include the prohibition on furnishing non-family labor. Copy of agree-
ment used by John Faulkner, Decatur, Mich. (in author's possession).
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ladder... through tenancy to ownership."' 12 Such a constraint should
in itself disqualify the arrangement as independent contracting. More-
over, in the real world of employment such a restriction is manifestly
designed to create the prerequisites for the unbridled exploitation of mi-
nor family members. By detaching himself from the employment nexus
and assigning the family members to the family head, who is privileged
by law to engage in exploitation prohibited to strangers, or by classifying
the family as a non-hierarchical cooperative group, which is similarly
privileged to engage in self-exploitation, the farmer appropriates addi-
tional labor time at little cost. The incentive to the family lies in the
additional piece-rate earnings it obtains through the children's labor.
The court further found that "Brandel supplies irrigation and pesti-
cides as he determines to be necessary upon notification of the need for
such by the migrants." ' 3 Although the Sixth Circuit stated that "[t]he
price for the pickles is set unilaterally by the processors in advance of the
harvest season," I 4 it failed even to ask whether in economic reality the
migrants might be employees of the processor-an important considera-
tion in light of the fact that a few large entities such as Campbell Soup
Co. (through its subsidiary, Vlasic Foods, Inc.), General Foods (now
part of Philip Morris), and Heinz control the market. 1 5 The parties
themselves had stipulated that "each individual harvester's capital in-
vestment in their work with Brandel consisted of their pails and gloves,"
whereas "Brandel ha[d] a substantial capital investment in specialized
equipment for his pickle farming operations" including tractors, irriga-
tion equipment, trucks and a grading station that alone cost $62,000-
$72,000.1 16 Brandel also contractually agreed to prepare the land, plant,
cultivate, hoe, and spray the crop, furnish the seed and fertilizer, "and to
pay any other costs incurred in growing of the crop." He also agreed to
112. Memorandum to Paul Appleby, Office of the Secretary of Labor, from A.G. Black, Chief
of Bureau of Agricultural Economics (June 4, 1937) (copy furnished by Wayne Rasmussen, Chief,
Agricultural History Branch, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture). For belated recognition of the existence of
a stratum of farm laborers who would never ascend the ladder, see Ham, Farm Labor in an Era of
Change, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 1940, at 907, 909-10.
113. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1116 (footnote omitted).
114. Id.
115. Farm Labor Org. Comm., Fact Sheet on Sharecropping (July 25, 1984); Telephone inter-
view with Pickle Packers International, Inc. (June 23, 1989). Some of the smaller farmers may be
mere part-time contract farmers operating under adhesion output contracts with the processors,
Telephone interview with Jeff Welch, former FLOC attorney (May 23, 1989). On contract farming,
see M. Pfeffer, The Social Relations of Subcontracting: The Case of Contract Vegetable Production
in Wisconsin (Working Paper No. 2, Center for Comparative Studies in the Sociology of Agricul-
ture, Univ. Wis.) (undated [ca. 1982-83]).
116. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1118 & 1118 n.8.
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furnish all receptacles used for harvesting and to transport the pickles to
the receiving station. The agreement did not even pretend that the picker
was involved in the decisions concerning the sale of the crop." 7
Crucially the court recited the alleged reason for sharecropping:
This method of "subcontracting" was found to have been imple-
mented because of the unique aspects of pickle marketing. Unlike
most other crops, the market price of the pickles does not increase
proportionately with their size, i.e., there are seven specific size grades,
and the smaller pickles bring a higher price per pound than larger
pickles. Paying harvesters on a piecework basis had proved to be less
profitable because of the extensive and ineffective supervision it
required. 118
Here the court cavalierly glossed over the fact that asparagus hand-har-
vesters must also be selective because they are docked for culls and yet
have not been subjected to sharecropping, while strawberries are not
graded" 9 but have been the object of sharecropping. 120 Indeed, it did
not even blink at the fact that thirty-six of the families working for
Brandel were engaged in heteromorphic operations insofar as they simul-
taneously worked as Brandel's employees picking strawberries. 12 1 More-
over, the court failed to go behind its superficial description to get at the
underlying economic reality. One possible explanation for this failure to
acknowledge the existence of employer-employee-like authority relations
between such unskilled hand-laborers and farm operators 122 is that,
although the latter may have the legal power and technological expertise
117. Share the Pickle Crop--Partnership Agreement (1976) (copy in author's possession).
118. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1116.
119. A difference in quality may exist between strawberries for the fresh and frozen markets, but
they are not grown in the same field at the same time. Runsten, Competition in Strawberries, in
MARKETING CALIFORNIA SPECIALTY CROPS: WORLDWIDE COMPETITION AND CONSTRAINTS:
COMPETITIVENESS AT HOME AND ABROAD 47, 50-51 (1987).
120. Brief of Amicus Curiae Farm Labor Organizing Committee at 18, Brandel (No. 83-1228).
121. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117.
122. This failure is not unique to the judiciary:
Although job incumbents may continue to hold jobs for a considerable period of time, and
may claim to be subject to an authority relationship, all that they are essentially doing is
continuously meeting bids for their jobs in the spot market.... That adaptive, sequential
decisionmaking can be effectively implemented in sequential spot labor markets which sat-
isfy the low transition cost assumption (as some apparently do, e.g., migrant farm labor),
without posing issues that differ in kind from the usual grocer-customer relationship, seems
uncontestable.
Williamson, Wachter & Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyn-
cratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 264-65 (1975).
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to supervise and control the former, the importance of their actually ex-
ercising that control diminishes as their ability to spell out orders in ad-
vance increases; 123 and that ability, in turn, increases as the skill required
of the workers decreases.
In fact, because the hand-harvesting of many commodities is a sim-
ple task that requires supervision only because the combination of low
hourly wages and arduousness invites "shirking," and the quality or
standard of the output is as costly to monitor as the quantity of the labor
input, it may become cheaper for employers to dispense with direct su-
pervision altogether by introducing piece rates. 124 The obvious advan-
tage of the piece-rate system is that it forces the employee to internalize
directly the price-discipline and concomitant self-monitoring that the
market normally imposes on the firm.' 25 Some pickle farmers have
achieved this result by initiating for their employee-pickers a piece-rate
differentiated according to the size of the pickle. The grading machine in
effect replaces the field supervisor. What Brandel has done, however, is
merely to call the internalized piece-rate system "sharecropping,"' 126 be-
cause the piece rate happens to approximate fifty percent of the crop
price he receives-provided he does not pay social security or unemploy-
ment insurance taxes or workers' compensation premiums. Indeed, ear-
lier, farmers had paid pickers on a fifty-fifty basis while treating them as
employees, and some still do.'27 In point of fact, sharecropping contrib-
utes no more than a graded piece rate does to the elimination of the costs
associated with supervision or to the creation of disincentives for picking
large pickles, which are easier to find and to pick but for which the
processors pay less. 128
Finally, the Sixth Circuit virtually preordained the outcome of the
123. W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECO-
NOMIC PRINCIPLES 12 (3d ed. 1988).
124. See S. CHEUNG, THE THEORY OF SHARE TENANCY 67 n.12 (1969).
125. See Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy, 6
BELL J. ECON. 552 (1975).
126. His own expert witness, Professor Shapley, admitted that it was merely a "sophisticated
form of piece rate." BriefofAmicus Curiae Farm Labor Organizing Committee at 17, Brandel (No.
83-1228).
127. Sharecropping Contract Lowers Workers' Wages, 3 UNDER THE BURNING SUN, July 1976,
at 1. In many areas pickle pickers are treated as employees and paid on a piece rate. E.g., Washing-
ton v. Miller, 721 F.2d 797 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Alzalde v. Ocanas, 580 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Colo. 1984).
Telephone interview with Baldemar Velasquez, President, FLOC (May 22, 1989).
128. John Faulkner, a large pickle farmer in Michigan who has been sued more than once,
responded evasively but truthfully when asked what sharecropping added to the graded piece-rate
system: "We can't afford to pay workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, etc." Tele-
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case by accepting the trial judge's vacuous characterization of the mi-
grant children's ability to "progress gradually to an active role in the
harvesting" as merely the achievement of the parents' primary purpose in
"develop[ing their] basic skills and family unity."'129
Against this situational background, the court embarked upon its
march through the economic-reality-test factors, beginning with the least
coherent and intelligible one-the permanency of the relationship. View-
ing the possible spectrum from temporary to permanent employment
with the former apparently contradicting and the latter supporting a con-
clusion of employee status, the court accepted the trial judge's finding of
a temporary relationship. The Sixth Circuit also embraced Judge Gib-
son's meaningless ruling-designed to undercut the DOL's argument
that annually repeated engagements constituted permanency-that such
re-engagement "was a product of a mutually satisfactory arrangement
rather than the permanent relationship between them."13
Adjudications such as this one should prompt consideration of the
need to jettison the factor of permanency altogether, especially since a
typical setting in which the factor could be dispositive is difficult to imag-
ine. The reason the permanency factor is not calculated to distinguish
between economic dependence and independence is that it serves to mask
rather than to illuminate what dependence means. To the essence of a
capitalist economy belong both free enterprise and the free movement of
labor. If the mere exercise of the latter freedom-as enshrined in the
prohibition on involuntary servitude embodied in the thirteenth amend-
ment-were per se an indicium of economic independence, the absurd
result would be the presumptive conversion of all seasonal and casual
workers and day laborers into independent contractors.13 1 Attentiveness
to this dangerous slippery slope led the Fifth Circuit to hold recently that
the remedial purposes of the FLSA "are not defeated merely because
essentially fungible piece workers work from time to time for neighboring
129. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117.
130. Id. at 1117. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit failed to mention Judge Gibson's finding that
some pickers remain for only five of the seven or more pickings. Marshall v. Brandel, No. G76-393-
CA6, slip op. at 4 (V.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 1983). Although these two courts sought to make much of
the fact that each family had its field under its own "dominion," the fact that when families regularly
leave the harvest early-either to enable their children to return to Texas to school or because the
yields are decreasing-the pickle farmers assign other families to pick those fields indicates that a
run-of-the-mill employment relationship exists.
131. See Linder, Employees, Not-So-Independent Contractors, and the Case of Migrant
Farmworkers: A Challenge to the "Law and Economics"Agency Doctrine, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 435, 469-71 (1987).
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competitors. Laborers who work for two different employers on alter-
nate days are no less economically dependent on their employers than
laborers who work for a single employer."'' 3 2
In analyzing the central factor of skill, the Sixth Circuit again al-
most willfully misconceived the role played by skill in identifying eco-
nomic dependence. Skill refers both to some absolute level required by
the task and to the relative skill levels as between the worker and the
entity for which he is working. The relational property is crucial because
it indicates whether the putative employer knows more about the work
than the worker and hence can control and integrate him into his busi-
ness. A high absolute skill level is less dispositive because a highly
trained pilot, doctor, or lawyer may still be an employee if his employer
can supervise him substantively. A low level or absence of skill, on the
other hand, is almost always relevant because it implies that almost any
entity has the knowledge to supervise the worker. 133
The appeals court's affirmance of Judge Gibson's finding that "an
experienced harvester possesses a degree of skill in both the care of the
pickle plants and judgment in the picking of the fruit itself,"'' 3 4 miscon-
strues "skill" to mean nothing more than that with time one can become
faster and more proficient at even the most unskilled tasks-for example,
ditch-digging. The circumstance that the court engaged is not only irrel-
evant to a finding of economic independence but also overlooks the fun-
damental fact that work that seven-year-olds routinely perform
competently 135M-such as being able to tell the difference between big and
small cucumbers-cannot be skilled: "Farm work performed by the mi-
grant workers is unskilled labor. No argument to the contrary is possi-
ble. No special skill ... is necessary to perform the tasks of pulling vines
and weeds, picking cucumbers .... 6
That the court did not understand the function of skill within the
framework of the economic reality test emerged from a footnote in which
it stated that it was "mindful of the determination by the Supreme Court
... that there may be a fine line between pieceworking and skilled labor:
'While profits to the boners depended upon the efficiency of their work, it
was more like piecework than an enterprise that actually depended for
132. McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1989), modifying 861 F.2d 450
(1988).
133. See Linder, supra note 131, at 454 n.125.
134. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117.
135. Brief of Appellant at 30, Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984) (No. 83-1228).
136. Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 588 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
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success upon the initiative, judgment or foresight of the typical independ-
ent contractor.' "137 Here the Supreme Court was not discussing skill at
all but what constituted an independent business. Skill, however, is not a
prerequisite of self-employment-as the peddler or small store owner
demonstrates.
Unable to get around the obviously enormous disparity between
Brandel's sizable investment in equipment and facilities and the migrants
"investment in ... their pails and gloves," both courts sought to down-
play this factor by stating that it was not determinative because Brandel
had little invested directly in the harvesting process.138 With the same
crabbed logic it could be said that the worker who uses a five-dollar
broom to sweep the floor of a hundred-million-dollar factory all day is an
independent contractor because none of the hundred million dollars was
invested in sweeping. Moreover, this view disregards the key function
that investment fulfills with regard to the opportunity for profit and the
risk of loss.
In its only implied cricitism or deviation from the lower court, the
Sixth Circuit conceded that the record did not "support the finding that
these workers are actually exposed to any risk of loss."' 39 After all, that
Brandel had paid the harvesters for their pickles in 1980 even though he
had been unable to sell them"4 should have been dispositive of the whole
case. Yet despite the fact that the risk of loss rather than the chance for
profit essentially defines an independent enterprise, 141 the court created
all manner of unnecessary confusion by the unfounded and unsupported
assertion "that the opportunity for greater earnings based upon manage-
ment of the fields ... is not solely a function of a piecework method of
compensation." 142
The Sixth Circuit also upheld the lower court's finding that Brandel
lacked the right to control the details of the harvesting. 143 In the first
instance it arrived at this conclusion by disregarding the total and perva-
sive control that the farmer exercised over the entire operation in which
the pickers were but a cog. Second, the courts neglected the venerable
137. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1118 n.7 (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722,
730 (1947)).
138. Id. at 1118.
139. Id. at 1119.
140. Id.
141. Flannigan, Enterprise Control The Servant-Independent Contractor Distinction, 37 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 25, 46-47 (1987).
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judicial insight that an employer cannot bootstrap his employee into in-
dependent contractor status by relying on the fact that the work is so
simple that it requires no supervision. And third, the courts viewed the
defendant's alleged "design to relinquish control of the harvesting to the
migrant worker" as part of "the trend towards subcontracting major as-
pects of farming operations such as plowing, crop dusting and grain har-
vesting."'" This conclusion, adopted verbatim from Judge Gibson's
opinion, omitted mention of the latter's major premise: "For at least 40
years, the only profitable method of harvesting pickles has been by sub-
contracting to 'independent contractors .... "'45 Yet, as already noted,
various methods of compensating pickle pickers, including hourly and
graded and ungraded piece rates for direct employees, have coexisted for
years in the Midwest. Moreover, no plausible inferences can be drawn
from these activities because they all represent specialized, capital inten-
sive, skilled, and independent operations that are not integrated into the
farmer's business. The migrants, by contrast, "were not specialists called
in to solve a special problem, but unskilled laborers who performed the
essential everyday chores of [the defendant's] operation."' 146
The factor of integration the court discussed briefly without benefit
of the trial judge's comments. Although Judge Churchill was con-
strained to imply that the workers were indeed an integral part of
Brandel's operation, he quickly shifted ground to deny that the migrants
were economically dependent on Brandel. The reasons he adduced were
embarrassingly jejune. First, Brandel did not control the pickle prices to
which their pay was directly related. By this logic virtually no farmer in
the world would be an employer. Second, the migrants could find similar
work elsewhere. 147 Again, by this logic no worker except an immobile
resident of a company town would qualify as an employee. As the ad
absurdum arguments demonstrate, the issue is not whether a worker is
economically dependent on a particular employer, but on "finding em-
ployment in the business of others"' 48-rather than in his own independ-
ent business.
Having triumphantly manipulated the economic-reality-test factors,
the court in conclusion preemptively denied the DOL's alleged request
for a per se rule that all migrant farmworkers are employees under the
144. Id. at 1119 & n.9.
145. Marshall v. Brandel, No. G76-393-CA6, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 1983).
146. McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1989).
147. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1120.
148. Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op Growers of Florida, Inc., 166 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1948).
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FLSA. 4 9 Although the DOL never submitted such a request, solid
grounds for granting it exist."'
Brandel has had a significant real-world impact, strengthening
pickle farmers' demands in Michigan (and Ohio) that workers submit to
the loss of their rights to minimum wages and unemployment insurance
benefits. For fear of running afoul of sanctions for filing frivolous law-
suits,1 51 some lawyers have refrained from challenging sharecropping.
Unless the United States Supreme Court overturns Brandel or Congress
amends the FLSA, defiance will have to supervene in the form of worker
self-help rather than legal skirmishes. And that may in fact be the next
step; for now that the Farm Labor Organizing Committee has succeeded
in concluding collective bargaining agreements covering half of Ohio's
pickle growers, processors and pickers, 52 it intends to push for the aboli-
tion of sharecropping, which it considers "the root of our problems," '53
during its 1989 negotiations. 54 Yet at the same time, when the court in
Donovan v. Gillmor decided a new summary judgment motion in light of
Brandel, it affirmed its decision 55 based on the Sixth Circuit's reference
to the "strikingly different" record. 56 Therefore distinguishability may
become the path of most resistance.
IV. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT: LAW AND ECONOMICS TO THE
RESCUE OF THE PICKLE PROLETARIAT
Shortly after the Sixth Circuit handed down Brandel, the DOL filed
suit against a pickle grower within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit.
Sharecropping was a relatively recent innovation in Wisconsin, encom-
passing a mere handful of farms, largely inspired by the farmers' judicial
149. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1120.
150. See infra notes 157-90 and accompanying text. Even when asked at oral argument in Secre-
tary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 243 (1988),
whether it wanted such a per se rule, the DOL declined for fear that someday a migrant with consid-
erable capital investment and skill might appear on the scene. Interview with Leonard Grossman,
Solicitor General's Office, Chicago Region, U.S. Dep't of Labor (1987).
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
152. Schneider, Migrant Workers Sign 4th Contract in Midwest, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1987, at 9,
col. I (nat. ed.).
153. B. Velasquez, Share-Cropping Is the Root of Our Problems (undated flier, ca. 1984) (copy
in author's possession).
154. Telephone interview with Baldemar Velasquez, President, FLOC (May 22, 1989). For a
distorted report on the background of these negotiations, see Cain, Field of Dreams: Vlasic Says New
Pay System Benefits Migrant Workers, Detroit News, July 24, 1989, at ID. For a rebuttal, see Lin-
der, Pickle Farmer "Scam," Detriot News, Aug. 14, 1989, at 8A.
155. Marshall v. Gillmor, C79-163, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Ohio, Dec. 2, 1986). Judge Walinski had
reaffirmed his decision on employee status once before on June 6, 1983.
156. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1120 n.l1.
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successes in Ohio and Michigan. Lauritzen Farms was represented by
Brandel's counsel and his litigation expenses were in part borne by a
pickle growers' association in those states. Although the original com-
plaint alleged minimum-wage violations as well, these were eventually
dropped, in large part because of evidentiary problems, leaving the child
labor and record-keeping violations intact. The work situation was es-
sentially the same as in Brandel. One twist involved a regulation promul-
gated pursuant to the Wisconsin Migrant Law, which prescribes, inter
alia, the signing of a Migrant Work Agreement and minimum guaran-
teed hours.15 7 Because the Wisconsin Attorney General had already in-
terpreted the Act's provisions to be incompatible with sharecropping
agreements,158 Lauritzen had signed work agreements stating the wage
rate to be "50% 3.35 P.H.," which the court interpreted to mean a guar-
antee of the minimum wage where the sharecropping arrangement did
not meet the minimum wage.' 59 This wrinkle does not appear to have
played any part in the adjudications, perhaps because the defendant
stated that he had signed the agreement under compulsion and did not
feel bound by it.160 The trial judge on a motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of employee status expressed his disagreement
with Brandel because "it disregarded the economic reality of migrant
cucumber pickers," who were "completely dependent upon Lauritzen
.... 161 Unremarkably, Judge Evans, like the Gillmor-court, found that
every factor pointed toward employee status. 162 After the court granted
an injunction the next year,163 Lauritzen appealed to the Seventh
Circuit. "6
The opinion of the court of appeals was, like the lower court's, a
rather staid rehearsal of the facts and their application to the economic-
reality-test factors, all of which it found probative of employee status.
157. Wis. STAT. §§ 103.90-103.97 (1988).
158. 71 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 92 (1982). Nevertheless, the attorney general also stated that, be-
cause the state supreme court had long held to the view that, absent an intention by the parties to
create a landlord-tenant relationship, sharecropping established an employer-employee relationship,
"the migrant is not an independent contractor and the agreement is subject to the provisions of" the
Act. Id.
159. Brock v. Lauritzen, 624 F. Supp. 966, 967 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
160. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 18-19,
Lauritzen (No. 84-C-980).
161. Lauritzen, 624 F. Supp. at 969.
162. Id. at 968-69.
163. Brock v. Lauritzen, 649 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
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The Seventh Circuit panel directly engaged the Sixth Circuit's interpreta-
tion and found it wanting on every point.16 The only remarkable aspect
of the opinion was Judge Wood's closing observation, which obliquely
exposed sharecropping as a sham:
The basic arrangement between the defendants and the pickle pickers
which, according to the defendants, produces the highest economic re-
turn for both grower and picker, need not be altered. All that need
change is the label which the defendants apply to the arrangement. The
defendants need only think of the proceeds paid to the pickle pickers as166
wages ....
Remarkable was Judge Easterbrook's seven-page concurrence, in
which this Reagan-appointed academic leader of Law and Economics
subjected the economic reality test to its first-ever judicial meta-critique.
Written in the witty and pithy style that he and his brother, Judge Pos-
ner, rejuvenating the tradition of Holmes and Learned Hand, have used
to enliven judicial pronouncements, the concurrence dripped irony and
sarcasm. Thus Easterbrook found it "comforting to know that 'eco-
nomic reality' is the touchstone. One cringes to think that courts might
decide these cases on the basis of economic fantasy."' 167 His ire appears
to have been sparked by the insight that a half-century after enactment of
the FLSA, no legal rule had yet emerged that would eliminate costly and
risky litigation over the issue of employee status. The balancing test of
economic realities he viewed as symptomatic of this breakdown because
it offered little guidance and begged the crucial questions.' 68 In particu-
lar, Easterbrook noted that enjoining the courts to identify as "'those
who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to
which they render service' does not help to isolate the elements of 'real-
ity' that matter."'' 69
After these introductory remarks, Easterbrook took aim at the vari-
ous test factors with sniper shots, some little more than glib debating
points but others more telling. Thus with regard to his colleagues' ruling
that the overriding consideration in determining control was the farmer's
"right to control ... the entire pickle-farming operation," Easterbrook
countered: "If this is so, Pittsburgh Plate Glass must be an 'employee' of
165. Id. at 1536-38.
166. Id. at 1538-39 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 1539 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1540 (citation omitted) (quoting Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)).
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General Motors because GM controls 'the entire automobile manufac-
turing process' in which windshields from PPG are used. This method of
analysis makes everyone an employee."' 70 For one as attuned to neoclas-
sical economics as Judge Easterbrook, his disregard of the crucial fact
that PPG and GM are engaged in and produce for different final product
markets seems disingenuous. After all, pickle-picking is obviously an in-
tegrated part of pickle-farming in a way that glass-making is not vis-a-vis
automobile manufacture. Although GM could (vertically) integrate
glass-making into its operations-just as Ford for many years integrated
steel manufacture-it has not chosen to do so and PPG presumably uses
numerous technologies to manufacture many different kinds of glass for
various product markets. Thus, a priori the notion that glass makers
could be GM employees is hardly far-fetched; it all depends on the con-
crete relationships-and in the pickle context the pickers' lack of skill
together with their complete integration into Lauritzen's operations is
dispositive of the issue of control.
While implicitly agreeing with the court that the migrants risked no
loss, Easterbrook quibbled over whether they had an opportunity for
profit. He managed to do this only by analogizing the family head to a
manager deploying labor "in a hierarchical organization."'' If the fa-
ther parasitically lived on the income generated by the exploitation of his
wife and children, the analogy might rise above the status of a joke, but
as it stands, the comparison to a consultant without capital is shallow.
Although Easterbrook readily agreed that the migrants possessed no
physical capital, he objected again that the same was true of many real
independent contractors who, however, have heavily invested in "human
capital"-such as lawyers. Though surely not incorrect, the reference to
human capital is but another way of referring to the next factor, skill,
which, Easterbrook agreed-as is only reasonable given the testimony
that as a ten-year-old, one worker learned how to pick in five min-
utes 172-- the migrants generally lack.'7 ' The permanency or duration of
the relationship he astutely regarded as incoherent and irrelevant since
no one-to-one relationship necessarily obtains between it and employ-
ment status. Judge Easterbrook properly chided the court for confusing
the (meaningless) "integral part of the employer's business" with "part of
integrated operation," but failed to see why such integration is
170. Id. at 1540.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1533.
173. Id. at 1540-41.
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Easterbrook reserved his sharpest barbs for the synthetic factor of
economic dependence itself. Pared of their cute paradoxical tone, his re-
marks boil down to this: the notion has been so drained of rigor that it
has becomd conflated with economic interdependence, a relationship
that, because it defines virtually all economic agents, cannot function to
distinguish between employees and independent contractors. 175 Easter-
brook concluded that if the courts insist on adhering to "[a] fact-bound
approach calling for the balancing of incommensurables, an approach in
which no ascertainable legal rule determines a unique outcome," then the
issue is for a trier of fact rather than one of law.
176
The tenor of Easterbrook's whole critique combined with the (factu-
ally unfounded) complaint that the court overlooked the "wrinkle" that
"the migrants share the market risk with Lauritzen"' 177 must prompt
puzzlement at what remained for Judge Easterbrook to concur in. Here
the surprise began. He called for a new beginning rooted in the statute's
policy " 'to correct and as rapidly as practical [to] eliminate' " "the 'la-
bor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary to health, efficiency, and general well-being of work-
ers.' ")178 Even at this juncture Easterbrook halted the journey again to
interject his market-knows-best skepticism about whether such purposes
might actually harm those they are intended to benefit "by foreclosing
desirable packages of incentives." 179 But resuming the trek, he conceded
that "whether it is efficient or not is none of our business." Rather, the
judiciary's (Holmesian) function is not to ask whether Congress did the
right thing, but to implement its purpose. Back on track, Easterbrook
174. Id. at 1541.
175. Id. at 1542. For an extended discussion of this flaw in the economic reality test, see M.
LINDER, supra note 96, at 233-38.
176. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1542-43 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 1542. Because the price is set at the beginning of the season and constitutes a guaran-
tee from the grower to the picker, it is only the grower who bears the risk of price changes. At the
end of the concurrence Easterbrook apparently recanted:
The link of the migrants' compensation to the market price of pickles is not fundamentally
different from piecework compensation. Just as the piecework rate may be adjusted in
response to the market .... imposing the market risk on piecework laborers, so the mi-
grants' percentage share may be adjusted in response to the market.., in order to relieve
them of market risk. Through such adjustments Lauritzen may end up bearing the whole
market risk, and in the long run must do so to attract workers.
Id. at 1545.
178. Id. at 1543 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1982)).
179. Easterbrook revealed a curious ignorance of the facts and of the law in referring to the
overtime provisions of the FLSA as "the important ones here." Id. Section 213 of the FLSA ex-
cludes agricultural employees from overtime. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1982).
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quickly moved toward an unprecedented judicial denouement. Because
the FLSA "was designed to protect workers without substantial human
capital, who therefore earn the lowest wages," it was also "designed to
defeat rather than implement contractual arrangements" that undermine
the paternalistic purpose of the FLSA.1 0
The migrant workers are selling nothing but their labor. They
have no physical capital and little human capital to vend. This does
not belittle their skills. Willingness to work hard, dedication to a job,
honesty, and good health are valuable traits and all too scarce.... But
those to whom the FLSA applies must include workers who possess
only dedication, honesty, and good health ....
There are hard cases under the approach I have limned, but this is
not one of them. Migrant farm hands are "employees" under the
FLSA-without regard to the crop and the contract in each case.1
81
It is a devastating commentary on how sanitized and devoid of
(com)passion liberal judicial opinions have become since the heyday of
paternalistic-humanitarian interpretations in the 1940s18 2 that the only
judge who, in a quarter-century of federal migrant labor law litigation, 8 3
has been bold enough to state the obvious-namely, that if any group
remains a certified protected proletariat, migrant farmworkers do-advo-
cates repeal of such legislation.'8 4
In opposition to Lauritzen's petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, obviously reluctant to jeopardize
the one victory the DOL had managed to win, argued somewhat disin-
genuously that, although Brandel and Lauritzen were irreconcilable, the
conflict did not justify review. 85 Solicitor Fried sought to buttress this
180. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1542, 1543.
181. Id. at 1545.
182. See, e.g., Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944).
183. Including litigation under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Labor v. Kunkle, [Wages-Hours] Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) 31,545 (July 22, 1987). See also In re Kokesch, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,006 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (applying the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 177.21-.35
(1988)).
184. Taking his cue from his brother Posner's unprecedented critique of the FLSA in Mechmet
v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 825 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987), Easterbrook closed his opinion
thus: "Once they know how the FLSA works, employers, workers, and Congress have their options.
The longer we keep these people in the dark, the more chancy both the interpretive and the amend-
ing process become." Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1545.
185. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 10, Lauritzen v. McLaughlin, 109 S. Ct. 243




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss2/1
1989] SHARECROPPING
argument in part by alleging that the cases were not factually identi-
cal;' 86 yet the differences he cited were not those that make a differ-
ence. 87 He further argued that resolution of a dispute over the status of
migrant pickle pickers could not press a serious claim on the Court's
discretionary docket, especially since Brandel was a deviant decision
without prospect of imitators.1 8 8 In the event, the Supreme Court de-
clined to review the case.' 89
In part because of the unambiguous judicial decision in Lauritzen, in
part because of the vigorous enforcement of state law,190 sharecropping
appears to have been euthanized in Wisconsin.
V. CALIFORNIA: A CORNUCOPIA OF CROPPERS
As sharecroppers, we were independent in name only.
19 1
A. A Meta-Marxist Interlude
In order to understand the peculiarities of sharecropping in Califor-
nia, 192 it is necessary to distinguish among three distinct though perhaps
related phenomena. First, pickle and strawberry farmers have resorted
to the same pure sham that pickle growers in the Midwest adopted:
merely calling their employees another name in order to reduce the costs
186. Id. at 14.
187. Id. at 14 n.8.
188. Id. at 15.
189. Lauritzen v. McLaughlin, 109 S. Ct. 243 (1988), denying cert. to Secretary of Labor v.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987).
190. See, e.g., Villarreal v. Yeska, No. 80-IB-42860-FB (Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, and
Human Rel., Job Serv. Div.-Unemployment Comp. App. Tribunal May 21, 1981); In re John
Knoch, No. 5057-S (Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, and Human Rel., Job Serv. Div.-Unemployment
Comp. App. Tribunal July 23, 1984); Yeska v. Wisconsin, No. 88-1301 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 23,
1989). As early as 1978, the Social Security Administration determined that because Wisconsin law
mandated direct payment to migrants, crew leaders could no longer be considered employers of
migrant workers under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 210 (1982). Social See. Admin., Claims
Manual, Regional Supplement-Region V, at R1283 (Sept. 1978). In 1982, the acting regional ad-
ministrator of the Employment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor in Chicago
directed State Employment Security Agency administrators not to accept interstate "job orders from
agricultural employers who treat their employees as if they are 'independent contractors' " unless
they provide written assurances of compliance with all federal and state legal requirements. Letter
from Acting Regional Administrator to State Employment Security Agency Administrators (Oct.
13, 1982) (copy in author's possession).
191. Bums, Hurt Sharecropper Fights for Disability Benefits, Santa Barbara News-Press, Apr. 30,
1989, at A14, col. 3 (quoting a strawberry picker).
192. Hager, supra note 10, at 3, col. 1, states-without a source-that "about 20,000 workers
engage in it in some form." Two thousand sharecroppers in addition to 10,000 workers hired by
them at the harvest-peak pick strawberries in the Santa Maria Valley. Bums, State Court Shakes Up
Farm System, Santa Barbara News-Press, Apr. 30, 1989, at Al, A14, col. 1.
35
Linder: Petty-Bourgeois Pickle Pickers: An Agricultural Labor-Law Hoax Co
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
of doing business. 193 Or as one employer phrased it: "If we go 50-50 and
pay the benefits, we're not going to have any profits.' 9' Indeed, Vlasic
is said to be singlehandedly responsible for the introduction in California
of sharecropping in pickles. 195 Second, California has also witnessed the
rise of a variety of strawberry sharecropping in which family heads (to-
gether with their own employers) co-exploit not only members of their
nuclear family but also relatives, friends, and, to some extent, others.
Finally, tenant farming 196 has emerged in the Santa Maria Valley where
some strawberry farm owners have leased their land outright to persons
who then, in turn, engage pure-sham sharecroppers. While the last phe-
nomenon is of very recent vintage and to some extent involves both ten-
ants who had been small businessmen in Mexico' 97 and former
sharecroppers,'98 the former two have been dated back to the early
1970s,' 19 9 having been implemented "because it proved effective in frus-
trating attempts to organize field workers.""
A social scientist specializing in the study of California strawberry
sharecroppers has misconceived the issue at stake by failing to distin-
guish between make-believe sharecroppers and potentially real ones.
Although Miriam Wells correctly observes that strawberry farmers were
motivated to convert their wage laborers into sharecroppers in order to
avoid their obligations as employers, she has fallen victim to the illusion
fostered by the farmers that they have actually reorganized production.
193. The center of pickle growing and sharecropping is the Watsonville-Gilroy area, which also
accounts for the largest amount of strawberry acreage, although sharecropping does not
predominate there. Perhaps as little as 15% of strawberry work in the Salinas area is sharecropped;
the major sharecropping area is located in the Santa Maria Valley, while further to the south in
Ventura and Oxnard sharecropping is uncommon. Snow peas are sharecropped near Morro Bay,
where Filipinos lease land and hire their relatives as sharecroppers, who in turn exploit Mexicans in
a particularly brutal manner. Telephone interview with Mike Blank, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance,
San Luis Obispo (May 17, 1989); Pryor, Fair Share?, CAL. FARMER, Nov. 5, 1988, at 30, 56; Burns,
supra note 192, at Al, A14, col. 1.
194. Burns, supra note 192, at Al, A14, col. 3.
195. Telephone interview, supra note 193.
196. Pryor, supra note 193, at 30, erroneously suggests that all sharecroppers in California are
literally tenant farmers.
197. Information provided to the author by Professor Juan Palerm, Center for Chicano Studies,
University of California at Santa Barbara.
198. Burns, Some Immigrants Can Reap Success, Santa Barbara News-Press, Apr. 30, 1989, at
A15, col. 3.
199. Strawberry sharecropping or perhaps tenancy enjoyed a previous reincarnation before
World War II among Japanese families, but it was significantly different from the current form.
Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 8-11; Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note
24, at 317 n.24.
200. Letter from Steven Belasco, attorney, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, to Ralph Faust, Agric.
Labor Rel. Bd. (Dec. 13, 1976) (copy in author's possession). See also Wells, The Resurgence of
Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 14-16.
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The only piece of evidence that she has adduced in support of any change
in organization refers to the fact that in reaction to a court decision, one
farmer made a loan to some sharecroppers to buy a small tractor.2"1 In
fact, they have not introduced sharecropping, but merely called their
employees "sharecroppers." In seeking to bolster this thesis, Wells has
also unavoidably mischaracterized the political-economic and socio-
psychological forces leading to the workers' acquiescence in or accept-
ance of their paper conversion into sharecroppers. First, in some areas,
such as the Santa Maria Valley, where seasonally sharecropping
strawberries is the only way for farmworkers to make a living,2"2 eco-
nomic coercion is the most plausible motivation. Second, in many in-
stances workers are not sufficiently aware of the statutory protections
afforded employees or of the tax obligations of the self-employed to be in
a position to make an informed or rational decision as to the potential
trade-offs between the two statuses.
Wells' theoretical ambivalence is reflected in the much more plausi-
ble position she has adopted distinguishing among share tenancy, share-
cropping, and share labor.2" 3 The first term refers to independent grain
farm operators who rent farmland for a share of the crop in the Midwest;
the second to "the most coercive, paternalistic systems" involving blacks
in the South; and the last to pickle and strawberry pickers.2°4 Whereas
the sharecroppers "were not free wage laborers," "strawberry sharecrop-
pers ... are more like wage laborers with a share feature to their labor
contract. That is, their share constitutes wages paid by the landowner
for the use of their labor."2 5 In fact, Wells' own descriptions of the
working conditions of the sharecroppers and share laborers reveal that
the latter are subject to greater economic control by employers than were
nineteenth-century black cotton sharecroppers.20 6
The vacillation comes to the fore again in the unwarranted signifi-
cance that Wells imputes to a written contract in establishing whether a
worker is a sharecropper and with respect to whether it explicitly charac-
terizes the worker as a sharecropper: "Perhaps most importantly, the
201. Wells, supra note 17, at 76.
202. Telephone interview with Jeannie Barrett, attorney, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Santa Ma-
ria (May 26, 1989).
203. Although Wells does not reference the distinction, it is a common one in the literature. See,
e.g., R. RANSOM & R. STITCH, supra note 5, at 92 (table 5.5).
204. Wells, Sharecropping in the United States, supra note 24, at 238-39.
205. Wells, Sharecropping in the United States, supra note 24, at 238.
206. Wells, Sharecropping in the United States, supra note 24, at 226-27, 232-33. The "foreman
exerts considerable control over strawberry cultivation and harvest, especially in operations requir-
ing business judgment." Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 305.
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contract identifies sharecroppers explicitly as independent contractors,
rather than employees ... 207 Because covered workers cannot waive
their rights under labor-protective legislation, for purposes of enforcing
the FLSA the DOL does not even consider such allegations and the
United States Supreme Court provides the macroeconomic and socio-
psychological basis for that policy:
[T]he purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who
would decline its protections. If an exception to the Act were carved
out for employees willing to testify that they performed work "volun-
tarily," employers might be able to use superior bargaining power to
coerce employees to make such assertions, or to waive their protections
under the Act. Such exceptions to coverage would affect many more
people than those workers directly at issue ... and would be likely to
exert a general downward pressure on wages in competing
businesses.20 8
Although Wells cites a French Marxist's cautionary statements as to the
"dangers of accepting juridical status as indicative of class bounda-
ries," 09 tellingly, she omits to mention one respect in which the contract
is congruent with reality: the workers bear no risk of loss of capital.
The gravamen of Wells' analysis is that these ambiguities in status
are objective and account for the workers' subjective ambivalence: "This
simultaneous holding of contradictory views of class status and interest
reflects the interstitial nature of sharecroppers' structural niche. 2 10
Thus sharecroppers define themselves as "small capitalists" in part be-
cause "[1]egally, they possess many of the juridical prerogatives of capi-
tal; economically, they enjoy economic possession in that they have legal
standing as the employers of labor power and are contractually empow-
ered to direct the labor process." And even though their involvement in
economic ownership is "very limited, ' 211 so that they "cannot be consid-
ered unequivocally bourgeois," their "legal tax status... reinforces their
bourgeois standing, since they have historically represented themselves as
self-employed."2 12
On the other hand, because sharecroppers are "heavily supervised"
207. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 304. See also Wells, supra note 16, at 59, 66.
208. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (citations
omitted).
209. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 313.
210. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 312-13.
211. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 309, 312.
212. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 309. The latter remark is a circular make-
weight because contesting their status with the IRS would be tantamount to challenging the non-
employee status the owner has imposed on them-a battle that only few are in a position to take up.
[Vol. 25:195
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and "charged with a limited range of tasks that are virtually identical to
those performed by wage laborers in the industry,"2 3 "they, like share-
croppers in other regions, can easily be viewed as piece-rate wage work-
ers in a system in which the piece rate is variable." '214 Moreover, if
because "sharecroppers also think and act in ways that indicate an identi-
fication with the proletariat," such as supporting the UFW, "they are a
form of disguised wage labor,"2 5 then the question must be raised as to
who has not yet seen through the disguise.
The only evidence that Wells adduces in support of the claim that
these workers function as capitalists is that "[d]uring the harvest all
sharecroppers hire additional workers, usually illegal immigrants who
are friends or relatives.... It is in their relations with these hired helpers
that sharecroppers experience the autonomy they are otherwise de-
nied." 6 Yet this analysis fails to do justice to the background even as
delineated by Wells-namely, that sharecroppers cite as primary benefits
the opportunity "to maximize the income producing potential of wives
and children ... and to 'become [one's] own boss.' "217 The opportunity
to co-exploit and tyrannize others"' is manifestly not the autonomy they
seek-which is freedom from the oppressive sort of subordination typical
of backward, paternalistic capital-labor relations. This false equation of
wanting to be one's own boss with wanting to boss others conforms to
Wells' assertion that "[i]n terms of the political and ideological dimen-
sions of the productive process, sharecroppers occupy the contradictory
position of the petite bourgeoisie, dominating and exploiting labor in
some situations but also being dominated by capital themselves."2 9 Yet
many if not most petty bourgeois neither supervise nor are supervised.22 °
Moreover, in the United States, as the most highly developed capitalist
society without a socialist labor movement, resistance to what is per-
ceived as oppressive working conditions has, even among the core indus-
trial surplus-value-producing proletariat, often assumed the form of
(fantasized) escapism into self-employment.221 If indeed any informed,
consensual aspect attaches to farmworkers' putative conversion into non-
213. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 310.
214. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 310-311.
215. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 311-312.
216. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 308.
217. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 18.
218. By one account "most of the abuses are committed by sharecroppers against their own
employees." Bums, supra note 192, at Al, AI4, col. 2.
219. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 311.
220. On this so-called pure petty bourgeoisie, see Steinmetz & Wright, supra note 22, at 980.
221. E.g., E. CHINOY, AUTOMOBILE WORKERS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1955).
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employees, they share it with marginalized workers elsewhere who, for
lack of other sources of income, enter into proletarian or sub-proletarian
forms of self-employment.2 22
By the same token, Wells inexplicably denies the kind of in-
trafamilial exploitation that is in fact the driving force behind workers'
acquiescence in the loss of their protected status-the opportunity to
press their own children unlawfully into service: because "little child la-
bor is used in the industry ... evasion of FLSA child labor laws is not a
motivation for strawberry sharecropping. '223 This claim, which is factu-
ally erroneous,2 24 contradicts Wells' explanation of the attraction of
sharecropping to workers. To the extent that the workers try to evade
the state's ban on such activities by consenting adults, the workers are in
effect seeking to slip back into a phase of original self-accumulation that
the working class (and part of the capitalist class) succeeded in outlawing
precisely because of its macrosocial Sisyphus-like character: while a few
might manage to make a living or even accumulate enough to rise into
the semi-hemi-demi petty bourgeoisie, the standards of the lowest stra-
tum of the working class would be degraded. Much like the Southern
black cotton sharecropper, today's share-farmer can boast of "auton-
omy" only to the extent that he can make full use of his family's labor.225
On balance, then, the image that most clearly emerges from Wells'
account of the family head is that of a crewleader who combines the
functions of labor recruiter and working foreman on a piece rate.2 2 6 In
this context it is of subsidiary importance whether the workers he co-
exploits are relatives or strangers. That Wells' explanation of sharecrop-
ping in California suffers from overdetermination and underdetermina-
tion emerges from a comparison with its analogues in the Rio Grande
Valley of Texas.
Although the proximity of a porous border and the total absence of
even a hint of union organizing activity provide agricultural employers
with unimpeded access to and control over huge numbers of impover-
ished and desperate workers, farmers nevertheless engage in a whole
222. See D. B6GENHOLD, DIE SELBSTANDIGEN 248-53 (1985); Rimer, Can Patrol: $35 a Shift,
No Bosses, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, at 16, col. 2 (nat. ed.).
223. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 19.
224. Burns, supra note 192 at Al, col. 1; telephone interview with Jeannie Echenique, former
reporter with the Salinas Californian, who has reported on strawberry sharecropping and witnessed
large numbers of children working (May 24, 1989); telephone interview with Jeannie Barrett, attor-
ney, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Santa Maria (May 26, 1989).
225. G. WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 94.
226. Wells indirectly concedes this point. See Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 308.
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range of identical or similar unlawful practices even in crops-such as
onions-the machine-harvesting of which already competes with hand
labor. That aggregate familial labor power is compensated at sub-mini-
mum wages on a piece rate rather than through sharecropping is secon-
dary.2 27 Moreover, in one prominent pickle sharecropping variant, the
packing shed, which organizes the harvest on behalf of the farmers under
contract with it, makes it a condition of employment that the family head
register as a farm labor contractor despite the fact that one who engages
in farm labor contracting activity exclusively vis-A-vis immediate family
members is not a farm labor contractor. 228 The purported reason for this
condition is to protect the shed and the farmers against the claim of using
an unregistered crewleader2 29 should the family head employ non-imme-
diate-family23° workers, while the real reason is to buttress the conten-
tion that the family head is an independent contractor. Ironically,
fantasy then gives birth to reality as some family heads, involuntarily
armed with their crewleader cards, permit unrelated single persons, more
as a personal favor than as a business transaction, to work with the fam-
ily, thus extending the universe of workers available to pickle capital for
exploitation at sub-minimum wages and without payment of employment
taxes.
The crucial point for the family head-whether he is picking pickles
in Texas or Michigan, strawberries in California, harvesting asparagus in
Washington, hoeing cotton in Texas, or hoeing sugar beets in Wyo-
ming-however, is that the family unit secure as much work, as many
rows, as many acres as possible so that as many--especially children's-
hands as possible contribute regardless of the depressive impact on the
effective hourly rate of pay.2 31 Such workers with few or no alternative
opportunities and hence low or no opportunity costs are accustomed to a
reservation wage significantly below the lawful minimum; living on a
227. Wells asserts that by adopting sharecropping the growers "altered the social and economic
relations among social strata" in part because sharecroppers, unlike wage laborers, "work as families
on a set plot of land ... ." Wells, supra note 17, at 74. Yet, as the text indicates, many families do
this as piece-rate laborers in Texas. Wells offers no information on what the remaining wage labor-
ers do and how their work differs from the sharecroppers'.
228. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1802(6), (7), (8)(B),
(10)(B) (1985 & Supp. 1989).
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982).
230. The "immediate family" includes spouse, children, stepchildren, foster children, parents,
stepparents, foster parents, brothers, and sisters. 20 C.F.R. § 500.20(o) (1988).
231. In the mid-1980s, large numbers of migrant families from Texas declined to participate in
litigation seeking to limit the scope of the lawful compensation of children 16 and under at below
minimum wage on the grounds that, if the suit were successful, the employers would stop permitting
such children to work.
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margin informed by a time-horizon extending no further than tomorrow,
they set their sights on an existential household bottom line that does not
even consider hours worked let alone calculate equivalent hourly wages.
In an artfully phrased understatement, Wells concedes that unlawful
self-exploitation is the key: "The element of anticipated self-direction is
especially important to sharecroppers, because they do not always make
more money than farm laborers.... In general, long-term sharecroppers
report that as a family they make more than they did as farm laborers,
although their per person return is below the standard rate for wage la-
bor in the area." '232 Abstracting from the point that Wells could just as
accurately have written that the element of anticipated increased family
income is especially important because sharecroppers are not always
more self-directed than farm laborers,233 it would have been more to the
point to report that their income qualifies them as "among the poorest of
Santa Maria's poor": "'There's very few sharecroppers that have gone
to the middle class.' ,234
Wells sees the practice of sharecropping on several thousand acres
in California at the end of the twentieth century as undermining the tena-
bility of nineteenth-century economic doctrines that viewed sharecrop-
ping as incompatible with modern capitalist production.235 Yet the
sharecropping that nineteenth-century economists analyzed was not la-
bor-only pseudo-sharecropping, but a transitional form towards capitalist
ground rent, in which the tenant's share in part represented compensa-
tion for having furnished part of the working capital, just as the land-
owner's share included interest on the capital he provided.236 Because, in
232. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 18.
233. One recent contract "even specified the color strawberries must be ... and the size...
Burns, supra note 192, at Al, A14, col. 1.
234. Burns, supra note 192, at Al, A14, cols. 4-5.
235. Among the proponents of this thesis she includes not only "[t]raditional Marxist scholars,"
that is, Marx and Lenin, but also the "[c]lassical economists" Smith, Mill and Marshall. Wells, The
Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 5, 21. In a later article Wells characterizes Mill,
Smith, and Marshall as "neoclassical economists." Wells, Sharecropping in the United States, supra
note 24, at 213. Her confusion as to Adam Smith may be connected to the fact that no fewer than
six times she dates Wealth of Nations to 1869. Wells, Sharecropping in the United States, supra note
24, at 211, 213, 242; Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 1, 5, 29. To be sure,
evidence exists that sharecropping, especially in the Third World, has been adapted to developing
the forces of production. E.g., Bardhan, Marxist Ideas in Development Economics: An Evaluation,
in ANALYTIC MARXISM 64, 70-71 (J. Roemer ed. 1986). Wells, however, has not shown that any
development other than family-centered sweatshopping is at stake in California strawberry share-
cropping. Interestingly, by asserting that sharecropping would not necessarily be inefficient if the
landlord regulated the labor, Marshall in effect conceded that it would have to constitute dependent
employment. A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 642-45 (8th ed. 1920).
236. 3:2 K. MARX, supra note 23, at 337.
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contrast, strawberry harvesters are merely agricultural sweatshop labor-
ers-"quasi wage laborers" "in a two-class production system" 2 3 7-- it re-
mains unclear in what sense "[s]harecropping is a new means of
controlling and utilizing labor .... 23
Indeed, ultimately Wells offers no "new" explanation as to why
farmers retain sharecropping at all. For if it is true that: (1) growers
consider braceros on hourly wages with close supervision the most effi-
cient and inexpensive labor;2 39 (2) the productivity of wage laborers and
sharecroppers is comparable; (3) growers still maintain fundamental con-
trol over all inputs and basic decisions and supervise sharecroppers
closely;24° and (4) the decline of the UFW and the steady increase of
readily available illegal and legalized workers24 1 have re-created a large
pool of vulnerably exploitable laborers: in what sense can it be said that
"the organizational principles of sharecropping are used ... to perform
vital functions that cannot be accomplished at the same cost under the
expected capitalist system of wage labor" 2 42-except that the label facili-
tates the unlawful reduction of wages and payroll taxes?
B. Strawberry Fields of Exploitation Forever
We pause here to remark the notable fact that it is rare for the
seller of labor to appeal to the courts for the preservation of his inalien-
able rights to labor. This inestimable privilege is generally the object
of the buyer's disinterested solicitude.
2 4 3
By the latter half of the 1970s, the system was already under at-
tack.24  A much cited case that became the overtowering adjudication
237. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 24.
238. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 24.
239. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 13.
240. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 17.
241. See, eg., Mydans, Strawberry Fields Bear a New Immigrant Crop, N.Y. Times, May 22,
1989, at 8, col. 1 (nat. ed.) (Mixtec Indians from southern Mexico as newest most exploitable mi-
grant pickers in California).
242. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 22.
243. State v. J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 103 Miss. 522, 567-68, 60 So. 215, 217 (1913).
244. In Hernandez v. Scaglione, No. SJ-8120 (Cal. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., Oct. 7, 1977),
the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board determined that the compensation of cu-
cumber and strawberry pickers was not covered wages because "the grower is dependent upon the
picker's interest, managerial ability, and skills ... , experience, and cooperation" and "has little or
no control over the manner in which the cucumbers are picked or the vines cared for." Two years
later the Appeals Board, in an appeal brought by the Employment Development Department against
a cucumber grower, ruled that "[t]o find that the petitioner had relinquished its right to control
would require this Board to close its eyes to the reality of the working conditions of the pickers." In
re Patane, No. SJ-T-748 (Cal. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. Sept. 13, 1979).
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on the issue, Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, Inc.,245 was handed
down by the Ninth Circuit in 1979. It is an object lesson in the diver-
gence between judicial pronouncement and real implementation. Real
came before that court as an appeal from a dismissal on summary judg-
ment. The appellants had filed a class action against Driscoll Strawberry
Associates and Donald Driscoll, doing business as Driscoll Berry Farms,
for failure to pay the minimum wage,246 which the district court dis-
missed on the grounds that they were not employees within the meaning
of the FLSA. The original complaint, which the plaintiffs had brought
expressly as independent contractors, alleged antitrust and contract vio-
lations by the defendants. An amended complaint, alleging that the
agreements were a "sham," stated that the plaintiffs were employees and
were owed back wages.247 Although the workers did not drop their com-
mercial causes of action, they did not appeal their dismissal.
Driscoll Associates, which held patents on certain varieties of
strawberries, contracted with Driscoll Farms to grow them.248 The ad-
hesion contracts-which "are so one-sided it's difficult to keep them on
your desktop" 249-characterized the workers as patent sublicensees of
Driscoll. While the farmer undertook to plant the berries, the workers
agreed to care for the plants during the growing season and to harvest,
sort, grade, and pack the berries. Apart from the hand hoes, shovels,
clippers, and hand carts, the farmer contracted to furnish all the neces-
sary tools and materials for these labor tasks. Despite the contractual
recital, the farmer in fact paid the workers a piece rate to plant the plants
according to directions.2 ° Although much of the description of control
was couched in terms of "recommendations" from the patent holder and
the farmer to the workers, the workers testified that the farm foreman
245. 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
246. In point of fact, opt-out class actions are precluded under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982); FLSA
collective or representative actions may be maintained only as opt-in actions. The reason for this
confusion in the opinion, which never reached this issue because employment status was the only
issue on appeal, may lie in the fact that the case was not originally brought as an FLSA action. This
point is discussed later in the text.
247. Real, 603 F.2d at 750.
248. In an unpublished research memorandum prepared for California Rural Legal Assistance
in 1978-79 (copy in author's possession), Teresa Hernandez stated that Donald Driscoll was the
largest stockholder of Driscoll Associates. Driscoll's attorney, Eugene Garfinkel, has denied that
claim. Telephone interview with Eugene Garfinkel (May 22, 1989).
249. Letter from Steven Belasco, attorney, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, to Richard Pearl (July
27, 1977) (referring to similar contemporaneous strawberry sharecropper contracts).
250. Real, 603 F.2d at 750-52.
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even prescribed the precise hours of picking.25 1 The patent holder re-
tained complete discretion to market the berries, which were packed in
crates bearing the farmer's name, and paid the workers a fixed percent-
age of the net proceeds weekly.252
In its brisk promenade through the economic-reality-test factors for
purposes of determining whether the workers had raised genuine issues
of fact sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment, the Ninth
Circuit found that Driscoll exercised control, while the workers had little
or no opportunity for profit or loss, investment, or skill, and were an
integral part of Driscoll operations "rather than an independently viable
enterprise. ' 253 Indeed, the court went so far as to state that it had not
even been shown that the farmer was an independent contractor vis-a-vis
the patent holder.254
Before the proceedings could be resumed on remand, the case was
settled in 1981.255 According to the eponymous sharecropper, Alonzo
Real, each worker-plaintiff who remained in the suit received $1,600 af-
ter attorneys' fees.2 56
The Real workers' behavior has, to be sure, been ethnographically
analyzed as an expression of the " 'contradictory' class consciousness"
congruent with occupation of a "contradictory location" 257 that "strad-
dles the boundary between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. '258 Yet, a
more plausible and coherent account, based on the foregoing analysis
259
and a contemporaneous study,260 suggests instead that the workers were
torn between opting for their statutory rights as employees and for the
increased total family income that they could generate by acquiescing in
a level of exploitation and engaging in a kind of self-exploitation prohib-
ited in an employer-employee relationship. Indeed, many of the workers
were insufficiently integrated into the civic culture of the United States
251. Id. at 753 n.11. In addition, during the four to five months that elapsed between planting
and picking, the workers did "not need to work in their fields daily" whereas farm employees in-
spected the fields daily. Id. at 752 n.7.
252. Id. at 752.
253. Id. at 755.
254. Id. at 756.
255. Wells, supra note 17, at 73.
256. Telephone interview with Alonzo Real (May 22, 1989).
257. Wells, supra note 17, at 75.
258. Wells, What is a Worker?, supra note 24, at 313.
259. See supra notes 191-242 and accompanying text.
260. Teresa Hernandez, untitled research memorandum, supra note 248.
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even to be aware of the panoply of rights (such as social security, unem-
ployment insurance benefits, and workers' compensation) of which they
were being deprived by virtue of their alleged self-employed status.
In sharp contrast to Wells' unmediated description of the sharecrop-
pers, who suddenly appear on the historical horizon without a prehis-
tory,2 6 1 Alonzo Real reports262 that before working as a sharecropper for
Driscoll he and his wife had worked as hourly employees at another
strawberry operation. They shifted to Driscoll for two reasons. First,
they hoped to earn more money; and second, they had foreseen union-
related turbulence, which they wanted to avoid: although they did not
want to be "scabs," they did not wish to be blacklisted and to lose their
livelihoods either. Very soon after starting work for Driscoll, they real-
ized that they were earning even less than they had as hourly workers,
but they remained because they saw no future at the other farms. Real
notes that he performed exactly the same tasks at Driscoll that he had
performed as an hourly employee with one unpleasant exception: he had
to purchase a pesticide backpack for about $250, about which he had not
known before signing up. He was not given proper training in how to use
it, and workers on neighboring fields tended to spray one another and
themselves because they were given no protective equipment.
Although only Mr. Real and his wife worked, most of the other
families had children working-children too young to have been permit-
ted to work had the parents remained employees; indeed, he confirms
that this opportunity to make use of children's labor was perhaps the
primary attraction of sharecropping. Although some workers also de-
sired to become "independent," this meant for them not financial inde-
pendence but freedom from a boss standing over their backs. But even
this dream was destined to be shattered; because Driscoll did not con-
sider the workers competent to operate the farm on their own, he super-
vised them closely. While it is true that the workers were dissatisfied
with the discrepancy between the amount of money they were earning
and the prices for which they saw the berries being sold, at no point did
they wish to receive a share of the crop and to assume the risk of selling it
on their own as entrepreneurs. They merely wanted more money, a fact
that impressed itself on them when they realized that they were earning
less than they had as hourly employees. The one or two workers Mr.
261. Wells, supra note 17, at 64, does briefly allude to the fact that many of the Real plaintiffs
"had previously been braceros, or wage laborers, on the same farm," but does not analyze this transi-
tion or seek to incorporate it into her account. Id.
262. Telephone interview with Alonzo Real (May 22, 1989).
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Real did hire were relatives whom, he says, he paid the minimum wage
even though he himself was earning less than the minimum wage. Even
at the time he realized that he was an employee-a status that was supe-
rior to being an independent contractor.
C. Sharecropping: Old-Fashioned Familial Sweatshopping or a Law-
Mediated, Dialectically New Class Relationship?
More recently Wells has expanded her repertoire to embrace legal
analysis as well, arguing on the basis of Real that "legal structures and
conflicts play a key role in the evolution of modern class structures"
while law itself "has become one of the forces of production." '263 She
263. Wells, supra note 17, at 49. Because Wells was manifestly without benefit of legal training
when she wrote this article, it may seem unfair to criticize her for errors against the commission of
which even a few days of law school would have immunized her. Yet in view of the rather grandiose
theoretical claims Wells advances about the law as well as the self-touting as to her extensive case-
law research, id. at 52 n.2, she has squarely subjected herself to the canons of scholarship. She
asserted, for example, that Sachs was the controlling case, unaware that the IRS, not acquiescing in
mere district court decisions, had issued a new revenue ruling on pickle pickers. Id. at 59-60. She
did not know that the legislative history on sharecroppers under the FLSA has been codified in the
DOL's regulations. Id. at 60. She failed to note that the Sachs court incorrectly understood and
applied the relevant revenue ruling then in effect. She incorrectly asserted that the meaning of "em-
ployee" for the purposes of the FLSA "has been established.., through the application of certain
common law tests." Id. The Supreme Court and the subordinate federal judiciary have in fact for
more than four decades uniformly held that the common law is not relevant to the FLSA. Id. at 59
n.13. Without any authority or argument whatsoever she asserted that among the common law
distinctions that have been modified "is the stipulation that the independent contractor status under
the FLSA is more inclusive than the common law principles generally applied under the SSA, so
that an individual deemed an employee under the FLSA may yet be found an independent contrac-
tor under the SSA." Id. at 61. Apart from the superfluous and incorrect use of the term "stipula-
tion," as a matter of logic her conclusion cannot follow: a more inclusive definition means a broader
one. Moreover, she failed to explain that whatever differences have arisen between the FLSA and
the SSA coverage stem from congressional reversal in 1947 of the economic reality of dependence
test developed by the Supreme Court for the SSA in the very cases she cited. See M. LINDER, supra
note 96, at ch. 6. She cited a provision of the NLRA as containing a definition of independent
contractor that it does not contain. Wells, supra note 17, at 62. Wells cited a 1979 case as having
established that sharecroppers cannot join unions because they have the power to hire and fire. Id.
at 52 n.2, 63. Yet the case was merely an unreported review of dismissal by the General Counsel
(not "General Council"; Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping, supra note 24, at 26) of the Cali-
fornia Agricultural Labor Relations Board (CALRB); statutorily unappealable to the Board or to a
court, it remains without any precedential value whatsoever. In point of fact, the CALRB has never
resolved this issue. Telephone interview with Don Presley, assistant general counsel of CALRB
(May 23 and 26, 1989). She cited extensive passages verbatim from the Ninth Circuit Real decision
without indicating that they were direct quotations; e.g., Wells, supra note 17, at 65. Bizarrely,
Wells created a pseudonym for plaintiffs' counsel although his name was stated in the decision pub-
lished in the Federal Reporter, a publication on the shelves of thousands of libraries around the
world. Id. at 66 n. 17. In her account of the Real decision, Wells appeared oblivious of the fact that
the rulings she ascribed to the court had been enunciated in literally hundreds of earlier FLSA cases.
Id. at 69. Finally, as an example of careless non-legal research, Wells misstated a secondary source
on the exclusions of farmworkers from FLSA. She stated that "only 513,000 agricultural employees
or about 2% of the national farm labor force" were covered. Id. at 58 n.1 I. A moment's reflection
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contends, for example, that as a result of variations in coverage defini-
tions among statutes, "employers' claims that their workers are exempt
...tend to be accepted until challenged in the courts. ' ' 21 This claim
illustrates how Wells' impatience with approaches that treat the legal
system as a means of maintaining "dominant economic interests" has
blinded her to a conspicuous example of precisely such instrumental-
ism.2 65 For an employer's power to "make the initial determination as to
whether a person performing services for him is an employee, '266 has
nothing to do with semantics and everything to do with the fact that:
Typically, the worker as an individual has to accept the conditions
which the employer offers. [T]he relation between an employer and an
isolated employee or worker is typically a relation between a bearer of
power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it is an
act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination,
however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed
by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the "contract
of employment." 267
It is, of course, open to a worker at the hiring stage to contest his em-
ployer's classification of him as an independent contractor, though expe-
rience suggests that this might not be the way for a worker to put his best
foot forward at a nonunion place of employment. There is also no inher-
ent reason why a labor-protective statute could not create a rebuttable
presumption that all workers are employees, placing the burden on the
employer to contest and overcome that presumption.268 Indeed, admin-
istrative procedures are conceivable that would make it very difficult for
employers-at least outside the so-called informal economy-to use self-
help methods to circumvent the aforementioned presumption.269 Yet
would have revealed an impossibly huge farm labor force of more than 25,000,000. In point of fact,
her reference said that coverage was limited to 513,000 workers on 2% of the farms.
264. Wells, supra note 17, at 63.
265. As an instance of the "dialectical relationship between the law and class struggle," Wells
cited the fact that Real "has already been used by public interest lawyers attempting to establish the
employee status of cucumber sharecroppers in the Midwest." wells, supra note 17, at 74, 76. Ironi-
cally, this characterization of the manifestly class-neutral and pre-capitalist aspect of the politically
indifferent use of precedent in briefs and decisions underscores the hollowness and shallowness of
Wells's own attempt to view the law instrumentally.
266. Streer & Boyd, Employee or Independent Contractor? Proposed Guidelines May Lessen the
Controversy, 56 TAXES 489, 492 (1978). The worker thus carries the burden of overcoming this
initial presumption.
267. 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAw 6 (2d ed. 1977).
268. See Linder, supra note 131, at 472 n. 162 (legislative proposal).
269. An important link in such a mechanism would involve withdrawing from employers the
initial unilateral authority to issue Form-1099s. See Linder, supra note 92, at 14. Britain established
such a mechanism in the 1970s in order to curb analogous subterfuges regarding labor-only subcon-
tractors in construction. Finance Act, 1971, 19 & 20 Eliz. 2, ch. 68, §§ 29-30; Finance (No. 2) Act,
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even where such a reversal has been implemented-albeit in very modest
form-legislatively, 7 0 in the real world of non-self-enforcing law, the
worker must take the initiative to vindicate his status.27 ' Where unor-
ganized and atomized workers are more fungible than their employers,
who appropriate the work product and pay the workers, they have his-
torically had to rely on the paternalistic intervention of the state to en-
force their already existing rights on their behalf. Sharecropping is but
the latest instance of such defensive intercession designed to restore a
protective (paper) status quo ante.
As further evidence "that the law bears a more complex relationship
to class conflict" than "instrumental and determinist" "Marxist ap-
proaches" can comprehend, Wells adduces the emergence "in some peri-
ods" of lawyers "who are advocates for the lower classes. '27 2 Here the
focus on privately retained lawyers who appear like a deus ex machina to
the exclusion of the more than one hundred legal services attorneys
273
who, financed by ten million dollars from the federally funded Legal
Services Corporation, file many suits like Real every year, impermissibly
skews the relationship and access of migrant farmworkers to the law.
Perhaps even more difficult to reconcile with Wells' analysis of the
class content of law is the fact that some of the most important em-
ployee-status cases have been prosecuted by the state itself through its
specialized agencies. Whatever class conflict inhered in the initial articu-
lation of the boundaries of the working class that called forth the protec-
tion by the state from overreaching employers attached to the inclusion
1975, 23 & 24 Eliz. 2, ch. 45, §§ 39, 68-71, and Schedule 12. On the economic background for this
measure, see Report of the Committee of Inquiry Under Phelps Brown into Certain Matters Concern-
ing Labour in Building and Civil Engineering, 17 Parl. Papers 107-58 (Cmnd. 3714, 1967-68). More
recently, the Conservatives have attempted to shift the burden back to the Internal Revenue. 91
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 147 (1986) (Right to Be Self-Employed Bill).
270. Thus the unemployment compensation statutes in approximately three-fourths of the juris-
dictions in the United States include a provision to the effect that
any services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment sub-
ject to this Act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that such
individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the perform-
ance of such services both under his contract of service and in fact.
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 522lb-17(g)(1) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added).
271. In the unemployment compensation context, for example, despite the aforementioned statu-
tory presumption, if the employer had issued a Form-1099 to the worker classifying him as an
independent contractor and failed to pay Federal Unemployment Tax Act and state unemployment
insurance taxes, the worker's claim would initially be invalid until the agency had conducted a
hearing and determined that an employer-employee relationship had existed.
272. Wells, supra note 17, at 51.
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of better paid, organized, or skilled workers. Although various factions
of the agricultural employing class succeeded for several decades in ex-
cluding farmworkers from numerous protective schemes,274 that success
has never been rooted in an argument that hand-harvesters on large la-
bor-intensive farms are not core members of the most vulnerable segment
of the proletariat. Even during the Reagan administration, the DOL and
the IRS never took the position that sharecropping is anything but a
scam;"' indeed, DOL litigation has contributed significantly to its sup-
pression in certain areas.
This paternalistic intervention on behalf of the most exploited and
defenseless stratum of the proletariat strengthens the argument that
farmers' efforts to restore the old regime-whether by fiat or by taking
advantage of the gullible-constitute a mere blip in the trend toward
more comprehensive protection. Similarly, the proposition that em-
ployee status determinations have "become a part of class resources ' 276
fails to reflect the fact that less competitive or profitable employers have
been known for some time now to try to restrict the scope of the class of
workers on whom the state has paternalistically conferred benefits such
as the minimum wage that they could not achieve through their own
collective action on the labor market. Because the Driscoll workers
were, by precedent, already entitled to the minimum wage, theirs was a
purely defensive action designed merely to achieve the restoration of the
status quo, which the farmers had unlawfully undone.
Wells portrays the real import of Real as pivoting on the "diver-
gence between the contractual representation of the sharecroppers' inde-
pendence and their experience of day-to-day dependence .... 277
Although an agency had urged the disgruntled budding entrepreneurs
and former Driscoll braceros to bring an antitrust suit, Wells depicts
them as having "instructed" their attorney to bring a "class action"
against the "joint employers. 2 78 The workers' attorney, who notes that,
as in virtually all such litigation, it was the lawyers who translated the
clients' lay complaints into actionable events 27 9-just as it was he who
eventually amended the complaint into an FLSA action after listening to
274. See Linder, supra note 5.
275. A DOL regional attorney who conducted one of the most important sharecropper cases
characterized sharecropping as "bullshit." Telephone interview with DOL regional attorney (May
17, 1989).
276. Wells, supra note 17, at 78.
277. Wells, supra note 17, at 66.
278. Wells, supra note 17, at 67.
279. Telephone interview with Melvyn Silver (May 22, 1989).
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the depositions that Driscoll took of his clients 28 -- confirms that this
exceedingly implausible scenario never took place. Under the rubric,
"The Dialectics of Legal Struggle," Wells argues that this contractual
''representation as independent," though initially to the advantage of the
owners, "was appropriated in its meaning by workers, and ultimately
spurred workers to challenge the economic and legal relationship. "281
"[T]he actual process of litigation altered" their perceptions of their sta-
tus, leaving them even years later "with what could be called 'contradic-
tory' class consciousness." '282 In reality what occurred sequentially was
that: (1) the workers were economically coerced or deluded into ac-
cepting independent-contractor status; and (2) their lawyer, enlightening
them as to the unlawfulness of their paper conversion, persuaded them to
accept their original and only status as employees. One dialectic on
which Wells failed to reflect is how workers can be "militant"2 83 and yet
permit a piece of paper calling them sharecroppers to undermine their
categorical proletarian consciousness.
If in arguing that law (e.g., the applicability of the FLSA to
farmworkers in 1966) "has become one of the forces of production" and
a "determinant of class relationships, ' 28 4 Wells meant that "the poten-
tial benefits of utilizing nonemployee, independent contractors are con-
siderable, '285 then surely few will deny that violating the law in order to
lower costs at the expense of defenseless employees without an alterna-
tive has always had its allures. But then no sophisticated sociological
theorizing is required to understand that the enactment of laws imposing
burdens on employers (or non-employing taxpayers for that matter) has
always created incentives to stimulate every employer's trivial urge to
violate those laws in order to avoid the additional costs. Alternatively,
Wells' claim can also be more plausibly and less grandiosely interpreted
to mean that the state-enforced application of a minimum wage can lead
and has often led to a real reorganization in the form of labor-saving
mechanization. Such a politically induced increase in capital intensity
is, of course, so familiar as not to require analysis.
280. Wells states that Silver took his own clients' deposition. Wells, supra note 17, at 67-68.
This would have been quite extraordinary and Silver states that it did not happen. Wells naively
believes that intervention by a lawyer to state a claim that his clients had not conceived is uncom-
mon. Wells, supra note 17, at 78.
281. Wells, supra note 17, at 74, 75.
282. Wells, supra note 17, at 75.
283. Wells, supra note 17, at 77.
284. Wells, supra note 17, at 77.
285. Wells, supra note 17, at 59.
1989]
51
Linder: Petty-Bourgeois Pickle Pickers: An Agricultural Labor-Law Hoax Co
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Ultimately the most problematic aspect of Wells' analysis involves
translating her conclusions into the rigidly binary world of social-welfare
and labor-protective legislation, which must affirm or deny a worker's
status as a covered employee. If the workers' alleged subjective ambiva-
lence corresponds to their objectively ambiguous status, what guidance
can her approach-especially given her own tergiversations-furnish leg-
islators, judges, and administrators, who are charged with drawing bright
either-or lines? Yet Wells has adduced no evidence to support the claim
that sharecroppers' working conditions or income warrant characterizing
such workers as even "penny capitalists" '86 or "lumpen-capitalists. '2 187
That even well-meaning social scientists, imprisoned by unworldly aca-
demic constructs, can generate employer-friendly theses to the effect that
"marginal producers hurled into existence by depression, under-employ-
ment or simple poverty' 288 are petty bourgeois, underscores the need to
move away from an employment-based, case-by-case statutory benefits
system and towards a guaranteed income based on citizenship.289
D. The Deukmejian Court Gets the Growers into a Pickle
Although sharecropping apparently declined to some extent in
strawberries after Real,z g0 it survived in other crops in California virtu-
ally as if Real had never been decided. By the same token, Real took on
a life of its own as disembodied appellate jurisprudence outside the juris-
diction of the Ninth Circuit. Not only has it maintained its position as
286. J. BENSON, THE PENNY CAPITALISTS: A STUDY OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORKING
CLASS ENTREPRENEURS 3-4 (1983).
287. Gerry & Birkbeck, The Petty Commodity Producer in Third World Cities: Petit Bourgeois or
Disguised "Proletarian"?, in THE PETITE BOURGEOISIE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE UNEASY
STRATUM 121, 141 (F. Bechhofer & B. Elliott ed. 1981).
288. Crossick, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Ninteenth-Century Britain: The Urban and Liberal Case,
in SHOPKEEPERS AND MASTER ARTISANS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 62, 66 (G. Crossick
& H.-G. Haupt ed. 1984).
289. See Standing, Meshing Labour Flexibility with Security: An Answer to British Unemploy-
ment?, 125 INT'L LAB. REV. 87, 98-102 (1986); Standing, Labour Flexibility and Older Worker
Marginalisation: The Need for a New Strategy, 125 INT'L LAB. REV. 329, 344-45 (1986). See also
Linder, What Is an Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 155,
183-87 (1989). Cf Euz6by, A Minimum Guaranteed Income: Experiments and Proposals, 126 INT'L
LAB. REv. 253 (1987) (objecting to proposal as too radical and offering modification thereof).
290. Wells, supra note 17, at 75. Driscoll's son asserted almost a decade later that: "We haven't
changed any of our practices since then. We settled out of court with the farm workers for next to
nothing. They probably lost their shirts in the case." Echenique, Court's Decision Gives Farmer
Backing to Use Contract Growing, Salinas Californian, Aug. 30, 1988, at 2A, col. 4. Although
Echenique reported that she had interviewed Driscoll, presumably she talked to his son Donald F.
Driscoll since the father was dead. Telephone interview with Eugene Garfinkel, attorney for Dris-
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one of the most frequently cited FLSA-employee-status cases, but unlike
most decisions, the citable half-lives of which rival that of a mayfly, it is
more frequently cited as authority today than a decade ago.291
Why neither the DOL nor California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA) 92 sought to enforce the rights that Real had inchoately vindi-
cated for farmworkers on the Pacific Coast is unclear. In large part the
answer may lie in the sharecroppers' ignorance of their rights or in their
reluctance to jeopardize whatever meager employment and income they
had. In other words, rather than false consciousness, the vulnerability
associated with the lack of an alternative way of filling an empty stomach
may have inhibited the workers. Farmers, on the other hand, have been
acutely self-reflective. For while cynically293 passing off sub-minimum-
wage earnings294 as " 'giv[ing] the farmworker a business opportunity...
that's the American way,'" they concede that they "like the sharecrop-
ping because it saves them costs for keeping track of payroll require-
ments such as unemployment insurance, withholding taxes, disability
contributions, Social Security contributions and deductions. '" 2 95
In the event, the next sharecropping battle came almost fortuitously.
In the summer of 1985, a deputy labor commissioner of the California
Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) issued a stop order and pen-
alty assessment against S.G. Borello & Sons, a pickle grower in Gilroy,
for having failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for its fifty
migrant cucumber harvesters. Two weeks later Borello appealed the or-
der, which prohibited the use of employee labor until Borello obtained
the proper insurance coverage, and a $5,000 penalty, to the Division of
291. See the relevant volumes of SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS.
292. Jeannie Barrett, attorney, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Santa Maria, has indicated that for
some years CRLA was persuaded by clients who sharecropped that it was better to reform than to
destroy sharecropping. Telephone interview with Jeannie Barrett (May 26, 1989).
293. In the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, for example, where pickle sharecropping has arisen in
conscious imitation of its Midwestern progenitors-its most prominent practitioner formerly worked
for a processor in the Midwest-even workers who know that they have a right to the minimum
wage and unemployment benefits decline to file suit because they fear being blacklisted and need the
income that a large family can earn. Although employees cannot waive their rights under the FLSA,
the pickle shed has sought to thwart legal action by offering adult workers the option of working for
minimum wage (including social security and unemployment taxes) for a crew leader; coyly it fails to
offer them the lawful functional equivalent of sharecropping: a graded piece rate as employee. In-
formation from author's legal practice.
294. Echenique, Family Farms the Hard Way, Salinas Californian, Aug. 30, 1988, at 2A, col. 1
(family of eight earning $1,000 per week equaling $20 per person per day).
295. O'Sullivan, Court Ruling Should Ease Sharecrop Woes, Telegram-Tribune (San Luis Obispo
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Labor Standards Enforcement, which affirmed the order. It based its de-
cision on the control Borello exerted over the entire operation, the con-
tractual prohibition on the workers' use of non-family members, and on
the workers' lack of investment.296 Two months later Borello filed a writ
petition in superior court. The evidence presented to that court included
the adhesion contract that Vlasic Foods, "the only commercial cucumber
grower in the area," imposed on the fanner and his workers. The con-
tractual recitals and the real working conditions were very similar to
those prevailing in the Midwest. A significant wrinkle was that Vlasic
maintained weekly picker summaries showing how many pounds each
worker picked of each grade and the amount paid; on that basis Vlasic
then issued checks directly to each worker. Borello's subordination to
Vlasic was in fact so pervasive that Borello may merely have been
Vlasic's dependent contract farmer or farm labor contractor and fore-
man.297 Finding that the evidence supported the Division's order, the
trial court denied the writ in January 1986.298
In order to understand the appellate proceedings, it is necessary to
bear in mind that in California, as in most states, the courts have inter-
preted the employer-employee relationship in the workers' compensation
statute by reference not to the economic reality of dependence test devel-
oped under the FLSA, but rather to the so-called control test-that is,
whether the employer has the right to control the methods by which the
work is performed.299 The lower court held that sufficient control was
shown to meet the test; the appellate court unanimously disagreed and
reversed although it stated that the facts were undisputed.3°° Because
facts enter into the articulation of law and law into the social construc-
tion and perception of facts, distinguishing between law and fact is, over
a broad range of circumstances, a virtually fatuous undertaking. This
interpenetration protrudes sharply from the appeals court's opinion,
making a mockery of its claim that it was merely resolving "a question of
law." "The share farmers were free to utilize their own methods and set
296. Borello & Sons v. State Dep't of Indus. Relations, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1475, 242 Cal. Rptr.
554, 555 (1987), superseded by, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253 (1988), rev'd, 48 Cal. 3rd 341, 769
P.2d 399, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1989).
297. Brief of Petitioner-in-Intervention Cirilo Lopez, at 2 n.1, 4, 25, Borrello & Sons v. State
Dep't of Indus. Relations 48 Cal. 3d 341, 769 P.2d 399, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1989).
298. Borello, 196 Cal. App. 3d at -, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
299. For a critical-historical analysis of the control test and its application in workers' compen-
sation statutes, see M. LINDER, supra note 96, at ch. 5; Linder, supra note 21.
300. Borello, 196 Cal. App. 3d at -, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
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their own hours. Although the Vlasic's [sic] pricing schedule was an eco-
nomic incentive to pick the cucumbers while they were small, the share
farmers were free to pick them at any stage of maturity."3 1 Precisely
such an approach was subjected to scathing judicial parody long ago:
Under such circumstances although the employer's 'relinquishment' of
his right to control has no factual significance whatever, legally it may
be regarded as decisive. Thus laborers are employed to empty a car-
load of coal. The employer insists that he does not control them, that
he did not hire their 'services' but only contracted for the 'result,' an
empty car. The means of unloading, he says, are their own, i.e., they
can shovel right-handed or left-handed, start at one end of the car or
the other. The administration of an act designed to relieve human
want should not be made to depend on our resolution of such verbal
antics.... The laborer with shovel in hand remains an employee even
though the employer, under the spur of tax or other liability, solemnly
recites to him a legal jingle: I no longer control you. Shovel according
to your own methods. I hold you responsible only for the ultimate
result, a pile of coal. You render me no shoveling services, but you
rather sell me a product: a pile of coal from an emptied car. Likewise
the typist on her machine undergoes no transformation into an in-
dependent business woman because her employer tells her that she can
choose her own method of working, i.e., type with 2 fingers or 10.312
All five factors that the appeals court adduced to support its finding that
the farmer did not control the workers have already been shown to be
ridiculous or at best irrelevant: (1) that Borello had no authority to ter-
minate the workers at will (even if true, millions of non-at-will employees
are still employees); (2) that the workers were required to furnish their
own tools (as do millions of employees); (3) that the work was of limited
duration; (4) that the pay was based on results rather than time worked
(although piece-rate workers are employees);3"3 and (5) that the parties
believed they were creating an independent contractor relationship
(although workers cannot waive their rights). In a futile effort to deny
that the workers were performing a detail task within a larger operation
controlled by Borello, the court meaninglessly asserted that it was neces-
sary to " 'distinguish between authoritative control and... necessary co-
operation where the work furnished is part of a larger undertaking.' "3G4
301. Id. -, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
302. Powell v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 345 Mich. 455, 472, 479, 75
N.W.2d 874, 883, 886 (1956) (Smith, J., dissenting).
303. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360 (1945).
304. Borello, 196 Cal. App. 3d at -, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 558 (citations omitted).
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At this juncture a funny thing happened on the way to dispute reso-
lution. Instead of acting on the DIR's request to decertify the publica-
tion of the appeals court's decision,3 °5 the California Supreme Court, on
its own motion, "granted" review in March of 1988.306 Because neither
party wished to litigate the matter further, four of the seven justices in
effect imposed review on unwilling parties. Shortly thereafter, five jus-
tices-including two who had not voted for review-requested that the
DIR, "deemed petitioner," brief "[t]he manner and extent to which the
decision of the Court of Appeal, and the criteria by which independent
contractor status is to be distinguished from an employer-employee rela-
tionship, may affect the enforcement of remedial legislation other than
the Workers' Compensation Law in the State of California. ''30 This po-
tentially broad ambit together with the new conservative majority on the
California Supreme Court triggered considerable speculation as to the
possible motives behind the involuntary review-especially when the
court expedited the scheduling of oral argument. 30
In the period before oral argument in November 1988 and then
again during the interim until the decision was handed down in March
1989, California newspapers provided what was probably unprecedented
coverage of an employee-independent contractor adjudication.30 9 While
some reporting served as a vehicle for growers to lobby the Supreme
Court with predictions of the destruction of the strawberry industry if
sharecropping were outlawed,310 other articles were based on original in-
vestigations into the actual conditions in the fields. 31  The level of inter-
est was also reflected in the large number of amicus briefs filed.31 2
305. CRLA filed a supporting request for depublication in February, 1988.
306. 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253 (1988) (pursuant to Rule 28(a)(1) California Rules of
Court).
307. No. S003956, filed March 30, 1988.
308. See Leland, Where Landmarks Come From, CALIF. LAW., Dec. 1988, at 34.
309. E.g., Echenique, Children's Harvest, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 19, 1989, This World at
10.
310. See, e.g., Siegel, Sharecropping: Local Challenge a Serious Threat, Santa Maria Times, Sept.
16, 1988, at 1. But see Siegel, Sharecropping Case Before State Supreme Court, Santa Maria Times,
Dec. 1, 1988, at 7, col. I (citing evidence that "[m]ore employers are seeking employees for greater
quality control").
31 t. E.g., Echenique, Family Farms the Hard Way, Salinas Californian, Aug. 30, 1988, at IA,
col. 1.
312. CRLA filed an amicus brief after its motion to intervene on behalf of a picker who had
worked for Borello was denied. The Farm Bureau Federation and Western Growers Association
also filed amicus briefs. The California Applicant Attorneys Association also filed an amicus brief
acting in the hope that the court had (perversely) wanted to hear the case because further exemp-
tions from the workers' compensation system would increase the filing of negligence suits in state
court. Leland, supra note 308, at 35.
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The majority opinion is structured differently than earlier share-
cropping decisions. The first, very brief part provides a quasi lay prole-
gomenon; the second part discusses the control test; and the last can be
regarded as an extended dictum on the economic reality test. After ex-
plaining that they had ordered review because they considered the issue
"of substantial importance, ' 313  the majority stated the outcome
succinctly:
The grower controls the agricultural operations on its premises from
planting to sale of the crops. It simply chooses to accomplish one inte-
grated step in the production of one such crop by means of worker
incentives rather than direct supervision. It thereby retains all neces-
sary control over a job which can be done only one way.... In no
practical sense are the "sharefarmers" enterpreneurs operating in-
dependent businesses for their own accounts; they and their families
are obvious members of the broad class to which workers' compensa-
tion protection is intended to apply. 314
Although this skeletal reasoning in itself met the control test standard,
the majority proceeded to note that while the right to control was para-
mount, other secondary indicia were also relevant. Especially in con-
junction with the need to construe the employment relationship against
the background of the purposes behind the statute; the overriding pur-
pose being "to ensure that the cost of industrial injuries will be part of
the cost of goods rather than a burden on society. ' 315 It is here that the
majority exhibited ambivalence towards the control test.316
It emphasized that whereas the common-law distinction between in-
dependent contractors and employees was developed in the context of
vicarious liability in order to determine an employer's liability for inju-
ries caused by his employee, the issue in workers' compensation is
313. Borello & Sons v. Department of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 345 n.1, 769 P.2d 399,
400 n.1, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 544 n.1 (1989).
314. Id. at 345, 769 P.2d at 400-01, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45 (emphasis added).
315. Id. at 354, 769 P.2d at 406, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51.
316. This ambivalence is also reflected on the doctrinal-interpretive level. Thus, on the one hand
the majority adopted a thoroughgoing realistic view in holding that: "A business entity may not
avoid its statutory obligations by carving up its production process into minute steps, then asserting
that it lacks 'control' over the exact means by which one such step is performed by the responsible
workers." Id. at 357, 769 P.2d at 408, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 552. On the other hand, it failed to perceive
the asymmetric relationship between the requirements of a determination that a worker is an em-
ployee and those of one that he is an independent contractor. Especially given the fact that the
burden was on Borello to prove that the workers were independent contractors, the court overlooked
the crucial fact that-even in the common law setting-while the presence of control dispositively
indentifies an employee, the converse is not valid: its mere absence does not necessarily identify an
independent contractor. In other words, the latter determination is a much more complicated un-
dertaking because it requires examination of all factors, no single factor being dispositive.
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whether the employer is liable for injuries to his employee.' 1 7 Yet when
the court came to spell out the difference between the two regimes, it
disappeared. For just as the employer's power to supervise is deemed
relevant to the former inquiry, the exclusion of independent contractors
from workers' compensation has been justified by the self-employed ser-
vice provider's having "primary power over work safety."3 8 To be sure,
the majority also added to the list of the criteria pertinent to workers'
compensation the self-employed's being "best situated to distribute the
risk and cost of injury as an expense of his own business," and having
"independently chosen the burdens and benefits of self-employment. '319
These additional factors, however, transcend the framework not only of
the control test, but tendentiously even that of the economic reality of
dependence test.320 For they point to the rationality of applying what
can best be characterized as a harking back to an inchoate economic-
reality-of-class-proverty test developed by nineteenth-century English
courts in interpreting the Truck Acts. 21
More than to any other modem labor-protective legislation, such a
test is appropriate to workers' compensation. Because the workers to be
protected are those who without coverage would bear the full economic
burden of work-related accidents, the purpose of the statute can best be
effectuated by interpreting "employee" to encompass all those unable to
channel the costs either through an employer to the final consumer or
directly to the latter.322 Thus a worker who cannot self-insure for medi-
cal and disability protection or pass the costs on, should be presumed to
be a covered employee. These are only seemingly distinct issues. The
financial ability to purchase insurance is a relatively simple quantitative
determination. Whether a worker can pass the costs on would be a more
complicated question, which would have to be resolved by reference to
the extent of his integration into the alleged employer's business. But
even if it were determined that the alleged employer were the con-
sumer-that is, that Borello purchases pickle-picking services-if the
317. Id. at 352, 769 P.2d at 405, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
318. Id. at 354, 769 P.2d at 403, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
319. Id. at 357, 769 P.2d at 406, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
320. It is unclear whether the court was acting disingenuously or in genuine ignorance of what it
was doing when it stated that it was adopting "no detailed new standards for examination of the
issue." Id. at 357, 769 P.2d at 406, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
321. See M. LINDER, supra note 96, at ch. 3.
322. See 8 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 43.51 (1987).
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economic reality of that relationship is such that the picker cannot bar-
gain for compensation sufficient to enable him to purchase comparable
insurance on his own, then the issue is again reduced to financial ability.
Without expressly forging all the foregoing links, the majority ap-
pears to have taken this very radical step-albeit in dictum. For it stated
that the workers
have no practical opportunity to insure themselves or their families
against loss of income caused by nontortious work injuries. If Borello
is not their employer, they themselves, and society at large, thus as-
sume the entire financial burden when such injuries occur. Without
doubt, they are a class of workers to whom the protection of the Act is
intended to extend.323
Amusingly, the dissenters were so preoccupied with fulminating against
the majority's empirically "gratuitous assumptions that the sharefarmers
do not obtain insurance coverage for themselves,, 324 that they failed to
notice the even more momentous legal innovation.
This change in the law, to be sure, the court achieved not through
application of the control test, but by anonymous reference to the eco-
nomic-reality-of-dependence test.325 Its frank declaration that "[b]y any
applicable test, we must dismiss the growers' claims,, 326 was valid for the
decision as a whole, but not for the specific shortcut it used to reach the
same conclusion. For that end required delineation of the aforemen-
tioned economic-reality-of-class-poverty orientation.
Although the two dissenters, who had not voted for review, rebuked
the majority for having granted review on a record that was "entirely
insufficient to furnish the basis for a decision of major significance, 327
323. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 358, 769 P.2d at 409, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 553. According to William
Hoerger, who wrote an amicus brief on behalf of CRLA and attended the oral argument, the con-
servative members of the majority made it clear at oral argument that they did not want to see state
welfare expenditures increase because private enterprise was failing to pay its own way. Telephone
interview with William Hoerger (May 22, 1989).
324. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 361 n.2, 769 P.2d at 411 n.2, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 555 n.2 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting). The majority did adduce some testimony indicating that, particularly when the loss of
statutory financial protections and the total number of hours worked by all family members are
taken into account, the workers may have been earning less than employees. Id. at 359 n.15, 769
P.2d at 410 n.15, 256 Cal. Rptr. 554 n.15, (Kaufman, J., dissenting). The dissent's effort to under-
mine the credibility of this testimony was unconvincing. Id. at 360 n.7, 769 P.2d at 514-15 n.7, 256
Cal. Rptr. at 558-59 n.7 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). For evidence that sharecroppers are in fact not
covered, see Burns, supra note 192, at Al, A14, col. 1.
325. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 354-55, 769 P.2d at 407, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
326. Id. at 354-55, 769 P.2d at 407, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
327. Id. at 360, 769 P.2d at 411, 256 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
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the gravamen of their criticism was socioeconomic rather than proce-
dural. Judge Kaufman's328 dissent unintentionally cast a bright light on
the difference between self-reflective realistic Law and Economics juris-
prudence as practiced by Easterbrook and mere ideological atavism to
Lochner-era dogmatism. 329 In an opinion oozing false pathos, the dis-
senters lambasted the majority opinion as "one of the sadder episodes in
the history of this court-a wholly unnecessary and inappropriate inter-
meddling in the affairs of and curtailment of the liberties of California's
residents," which would "end up harming the very persons it is paternal-
istically intended to help" and who had found cucumber sharecropping
"satisfactory."330
In faulting the majority for characterizing sharecropping as "a nefa-
rious subterfuge" without an "iota of evidence,", 33' Kaufman failed to
provide an adequate epistemological framework for his thesis that eco-
nomic and cultural coercion creates an appropriate basis for consensual
activities that facially debase one's own long-term life chances as well as
those of one's class: "[T]here is no law establishing that a person's deci-
sion to enter into a transaction is involuntary unless he or she has been
offered alternative arrangements. ' 332  In its unreconstructed Lochner-
ism, the dissent appeared oblivious to the fact that the entire edifice of
modern protective welfare legislation is profoundly rooted in that very
"law"-namely, that certain kinds of exploitation are intolerable.333 The
concept itself of exploitation Kaufman objectively jettisoned by virtue of
a Fourth-of-July-ism that extinguished all of economic science's elabo-
rated distinction between labor and capital:
They invest the value of their labor. That may be insignificant to the
majority but it is no doubt significant to the sharefarmers, as it is to
me. The value of one's labor is ultimately the source of all capital.
328. Judge Kaufman has for many years been notorious for his animus against unions and par-
ticularly the UFW. Telephone interview with William Hoerger, CRLA (May 22, 1989).
329. In this respect Kaufman is closer to the professorial Law and Economics of Richard Ep-
stein; see, eg., Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of New Deal Labor Legisla-
tion, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1982).
330. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 360, 769 P.2d at 410-11, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
331. Id. at 361 & n.2, 769 P.2d 411 & n.2, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 555 & n.2 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 364, 769 P.2d at 414, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 558, (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Reveal-
ingly,the only empirical reference offered for the assertion that sharecropping "is preferred by the
sharefarmer families" was the self-serving testimony of the Borellos. d. at 362, 769 P.2d at 412, 256
Cal. Rptr. at 556 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Judge Kaufman failed to mention that the witnesses to
whom he referred were the Borellos.
333. E.g., E. DURKHEIM, LE§ONS DE SOCIOLOGIE 235 (2d ed. 1969).
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Many generations of American immigrants have become successful en-
trepreneurs doing just that-investing the only asset at their com-
mand, the value of their labor.
334
Within forty-eight hours of Borello's having been handed down,
farmers went to the fields to tell sharecroppers that they were now hourly
employees.33 5 Such a swift renunciation of principle33 6 may have been
dictated by the growers' strategy of seeking a legislative reversal of
Borello 337 in keeping with their disingenuous position that Borello out-
lawed independent contracting as such. CRLA promptly filed a class
action on behalf of the sharecroppers of one large strawberry farm,
pleading both statutory minimum wage, workers' compensation, unem-
ployment compensation, social security, and sanitary facilities claims and
a variety of breach of employment and land-rental contracts, quantum
meruit, leasehold, unfair competition, and fraud causes of action.33 s
This carefully crafted complaint constituted a striking refutation of
the aforementioned thesis that the alleged ambivalence of sharecropper-
plaintiffs reflects the underlying ambiguity of their "contradictory class
location." Instead, this dual-track litigation-alleging both that their
designation as independent contractors was "fictitious" ' 339 and that the
farmer nevertheless breached the sharecrop contracts-symbolizes the
consistently pragmatic behavior that the sharecroppers have always dis-
played. "'When the sharefarmers get paid, they find that they are paid
far less than minimum wage. In fact, sometimes, they owe the
grower.... Everyone (working as a sharefarmer) has high expectations
of a big paycheck at the end of the season and it doesn't materialize.' "340
334. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 364, 769 P.2d at 413, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 557 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
335. See, e.g., Letter from Furukawa Farms, Inc. to its "growers" (Apr. 11, 1989) (copy in
possession of author); Bums, Workers Won't Get Share of Harvest, Santa Barbara News-Press, Apr.
13, 1989, at Al. Furukawa began paying workers $4.65/hour plus seventy cents per box. Id. at AS.
336. See, e.g., Duman, Court Case on Sharecropping Sows Confusion Among Farmers, San Luis
Obispo County Telegram-Tribune, Apr. 14, 1989, at C-7, col. 1; Keckler, Sharecropping Fallout:
Wait and See, The Packer, Apr. 15, 1989, at 3A. Immediately after Borello issued, the Grower-
Shipper Vegetable Association of Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo Counties held a "legal brief-
ing" at which one of the "[a]lterantives for responding to... Borello" was "[t]he 'find an alternative
labor avoidance device' approach." The Future of Sharecropping Following the Borello Decision
(agenda of Mar. 30, 1989 [copy in author's possession]).
337. See, e.g., Duman, State Moves Ahead on Sharecrop Ruling, San Luis Obispo County Tele-
gram-Tribune, Apr. 28, 1989, at C-6 (labor commissioner denies request by state legislators to delay
implementation of Borello).
338. Gonzalez v. Furukawa Farms, Inc., No. SM62038 (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara filed May 10,
1989).
339. Id. at 1.
340. Hodgson, Workers Under Contract Now May Not Be Affected, Five Cities Times-Press-
Recorder (Arroyo Grande, Cal.), May 5, 1989, at 9 (quoting district deputy labor commissioner).
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The same subjective maximizing behavior that induced many workers to
try sharecropping in order to earn more than the minimum wage has led
them to file suit in order to recover the minimum wage. Perhaps most
significantly, these selfsame newly emancipated sharecroppers have cho-
sen the United Farm Workers as their collective bargaining representa-
tive in an Agricultural Labor Relations Board election.34
VI. PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE PICKLE-PICKING:
PRO-CHOICE OR COLLECTIVE COERCION?
The Bill is a helpful measure, under which anyone can agree with his
employer that he or she is henceforth to be treated as self-emloyed
merely by completing a simple form.... Self-employment is one of the
most obvious escape routes from that sterile employee culture which
was recently condemned by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.
... Employers will be able to employ people.., without the fear of
becoming locked in by employment protection laws and the other bur-
dens on businesses. It is a short cut. At a stroke, employers will be
relieved of that burden.342
The political-economic predicament of pseudo-sharecroppers differs
radically from the situation in which similarly vulnerable workers found
themselves in the era before the rise of the modern welfare state. While
the opportunities for self-employment are hardly exhausted today, with
more than nine-tenths of the labor force in employee status, 343 Lincol-
nian notions of democratic social mobility no longer operate-as they did
in the mid-nineteenth century3 -- with a prejudice that wage labor nor-
mally functions as a stepping stone to self-employment. The extent and
degree of large-scale capitalist industry and the concomitant proletari-
anization of the labor force have become such a commonplace that the
trend towards dependent employment cannot contain the moral shock
value that it once did.345 Thus the problem confronting today's share-
croppers is not that legislatures are reluctant to intervene into the labor
market on their behalf. Nor does the problem lie with atavistic attitudes
341. Burns, supra note 192, at Al, A14, col. 6; telephone interview with William Hoerger,
CRLA (May 22, 1989).
342. 91 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 147 (1986) (Michael Forsyth, M.P.).
343. In February 1989, 9,605,000 or 8.4% of all employed civilians were self-employed; the rate
of self-employment was 45.9 per cent in agriculture and 7.4% in non-agricultural industries. 36:3
EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS, Mar. 1989, table A-24 at 30 (calculations by author). It is a research
desideratum to determine whether the Bureau of the Census, to the extent that it surveys any share-
croppers in its Current Population Survey, classifies them as self-employed.
344. See, e.g., E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 18, 23 (1977).
345. See, e.g., In re Municipal Fuel Plants, 182 Mass. 605, 66 N.E. 25 (1903).
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of the judiciary. Not even the aberrant Brandel litigation resurrected a
judicial ideology glorifying the entrepreneurial spirit of impoverished im-
migrants346 that a paternalistic state was unconstitutionally seeking to
suppress.347 Despite an unprecedented public relations celebration of
free enterprise orchestrated by the Reagan administration,348 neither the
judicial wing of Law and Economics nor the appointees of a right-wing
governor could take seriously the claim that pickle pickers are anything
but employees par excellence.349
Thus, whereas the late-ninteenth-century and early-twentieth-cen-
tury segmented labor market counterparts of today's migrant
farmworkers-namely, women, children, and men in certain extraordi-
narily dangerous or unhealthy trades-were rebuffed by legislatures or,
more commonly, by the courts in their efforts to secure by state interven-
tion what they could not through direct demands to employers, all three
branches of federal government, and state government have been rela-
tively solicitous of the peculiar vulnerabilities of farmworkers. Even
under the openly antilabor Reagan administration, the DOL abided by
its traditionally capacious view of the scope of employee status.
The contemporary problem, instead, is that in the face of continuing
hand-harvest labor market imperfections raised to the level of structur-
ally impervious lopsidedness by overreaching employers, state interven-
tion has not been paternalistic enough. That is to say, neither the state
nor worker representatives have summoned the courage to spell out the
distinctly antiliberal truth that regulation of this labor market will, for
the foreseeable future, continue to be Sisyphean labor requiring much
more intrusive methods to prevent employers from taking advantage of
those unable to refuse coercive wage offers or to extricate themselves
346. For an example of bathetic exaltation of sharecropping bordering on self-mockery, see Sub-
jagation [sic] or Dignity (undated [ca. Apr. 1989] flier produced by California strawberry growers
[copy in author's possession]).
347. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
348. Even the DOL's promulgation in the 1980s of new regulations expanding the permissible
scope of industrial homework is premised on the homeworkers' status as employees subject to the
FLSA. 49 Fed. Reg. 44,262, 44,266 (1984) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 530); 53 Fed. Reg. 45,706
(1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 516 and 530). In this special context it is therefore mislead-
ing to depict the lifting of the ban as having "taken on symbolic significance becuse [sic] it pits the
Administration's advocacy of free enterprise against defenders of New Deal laws that prohibit the
exploitation of workers." Noble, U.S. Will End Ban on Work in Home, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1988,
at 1, 8, col. 6. See generally HOMEWORK: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON
PAID LABOR AT HOME (E. Boris & C. Daniels ed. 1989).
349. The local newspaper in the town in which Borello's farm is located, editorially referring to
the pickle contracts as "ruse" and "bogus independent contractor arrangements," called for putting
"this question to rest once and for all." Editorial, Ruling Halts Picking of Pickle-pickers' Pockets,"
Gilroy Dispatch, Apr. 4, 1989.
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from the web of "desperation bidding., 350 Legislative or judicial adop-
tion of a per se rule that all migrant farmworkers are employees for pur-
poses of all labor-protective statutes would be one of those methods.3 5'
Doubtless some truth attaches to claims that a few California straw-
berry sharecroppers have been able to earn and accumulate enough
money to create a standard of living above that of the average migrant
farmworker. But piece-rate busters have often enjoyed such a status.
The mere fact that a minuscule percentage of workers can, through un-
lawful exploitation and self-exploitation, rise marginally above or out of
their class, constitutes no justification for sacrificing the rest of the class
on the altar of uninhibited individual self-enrichment.352 On the con-
trary, until that class is sufficiently cohesive "to coerce others to choose
collective interests over those of the individual, ' 353 the state must inter-
vene to prohibit pseudo-consenting adults from undermining their own
life chances as well as those of their children and their class: "to restrain
a person's freedom of contract may be necessary to protect his freedom,
that is to protect him against oppression which he may otherwise be con-
strained to impose upon himself through an act of his legally free and
socially unfree will." 354
The necessity of counterposing collective coercion to economic coer-
cion is worth considering in light of the ramifications of farmers' intro-
ducing more imaginative arrangements in order to elude the extended
scope of judicially interpreted employee status. What is the legal conse-
quence for example, of the imposition of real risk by means of an "agree-
ment" that workers retain half of the crop, which they then must sell on
their own? If the farmer can coerce workers into accepting, do they be-
come sharecroppers? If workers actually had the savings, bank loans, or
350. See R. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE WELFARE
STATE 133, 168, 367 passim (1988); R. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS
OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1985). A particularly blatant example of such self-destructive
behavior is contained in a petition by strawberry sharecroppers calling on the governor of California
to "overthrow" Borello: "Without this form of employment, there is no chance for our children to
assist us after school and on days off." Finucane, Sharecroppers Learn Import of Court Pay Ruling,
Santa Barbara News-Press, Apr. 11, 1989, at B3. A complete response to this argument was offered
by Mike Blank, CRLA attorney: "'If mommy and daddy make enough money, the children won't
have to be working."' Id.
351. Among other measures urgently needed in order to readjust the underlying supply and
demand forces is the strictly enforced abolition of child labor. See generally Linder, The Minimum
Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS. (forthcoming 1989). Federally organized
recruitment of migrant workers and mandated wage bargaining or setting are further desiderata.
352. See generally D. MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 208, 210 (1987).
353. Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and Boy-
cotts, 1894-1921, 37 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 113 (1988).
354. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 267, at 14.
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cash flow, to tide themselves over until they sold the crop, then they
might (involuntarily)355 have become businessmen. 6  But nothing ex-
traordinary would inhere in this scenario. For the process of capital ac-
cumulation is continuously thrusting up from the ranks of wage laborers
some individuals who manage to become entrepreneurs. 7  Those who
tried to survive on food stamps358 in the interim and failed would argua-
bly remain employees with a cause of action for back wages.3 59
If strawberry farmers can afford to invest $40,000 in a bug vac-
uum,360 yet do not have the cash-flow to "financ[e] the labor" or the
profits to share the proceeds fifty-fifty and to "pay the benefits, ' 36 1 then
one of two market responses will follow. If American consumers of
strawberries are unwilling to pay the prices required to sustain acceptable
wage and profit levels in the industry, then either they will have to forgo
eating strawberries while owners seek other outlets for their capital and
workers other employment, or strawberries will have to be imported
from Latin America.3 62 But if the Latin Americanization of hand-har-
vest wages in the United States is to be avoided despite the Latin Ameri-
canization of the labor force, scams such as sharecropping must be
355. In a California strawberry variant of sharecropping some workers are actually coerced into
this situation even though they do not have the cash-flow to sustain themselves until the harvest
comes in. In one instance, when a crop had to be destroyed (because it had been poisoned), several
months of (part-time) work went uncompensated, and the workers had to join the migrant stream.
Although the farmer may have had the resources to purchase crop insurance, the workers did not.
Telephone interview with Jeannie Barrett, Attorney, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Santa Maria (May
26, 1989).
356. A similar but not identical issue has arisen in Florida with regard to so-called pin-hookers,
that is, persons who pick tomatoes left on the vines after the farmer has picked the tomatoes he
requires for his marketing purposes. The pin-hookers buy these tomatoes and then sell them on their
own account to brokers. A dispute exists as to whether they are "farm labor" within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1484 and thus eligible to live in farm labor housing projects subsidized by the Farmers
Home Administration. Rivera v. Edenfield, No. 82-451-Civ-WMH, slip op. (S.D. Fla. July 23,
1984). The FMHA has recently proposed new regulations expressly excluding the self-employed in
order to codify the pin-hookers' ineligibility. 54 Fed. Reg. 14,824 (1989) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
§ 1944.153) (proposed Apr. 13, 1989).
357. See Cohen, The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom, in ANALYTIC MARXISM 237 (J. Roe-
mer ed. 1986).
358. Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(f)(1)(A) (1988) (provisions concerning calcula-
tion of household income for households deriving annual income from self-employment).
359. But see Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
358 Pa. 224, 56 A.2d 254 (1948) (worker may not have best of both possible worlds as self-employed
and employee).
360. Stockdale, Changing Times in Strawberry Valley, Central Coast, May 1989, at 7, 9.
361. Burns, supra note 192, at A14, col. 3.
362. On why Mexican costs of production may not be low enough to supplant U.S. supplies, see
RUNSTEN, Competition in Strawberries, in MARKETING CALIFORNIA SPECIALTY CROPS: WORLD-
WIDE COMPETITION AND CONSTRAINTS: COMPETITIVENESS AT HOME AND ABROAD 47, 53-57
(1987). Alternatively to the possibilities mentioned in the text, American strawberry producers
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outlawed and penalized. If farmers are ideologically wedded to the fifty-
fifty system, no legal impediment bars them'from using it-provided that
they pay minimum wages and employment taxes.363 If the alternative is
family labor compensated in the aggregate at $1.40 per hour,3" then, by
all means, let's "'return to the 1960s ... where we had nameless faces
making minimum wage.' "365
might succeed in expanding their exports or moving towards mechanization that does not destroy
the plants. Id. at 57-58.
363. Duman, State Moves Ahead on Sharecrop Ruling, San Luis Obispo County Telegram-Trib-
une, Apr. 28, 1989, at C-6 (quoting Labor Commissioner Lloyd Aubry Jr.).
364. Editorial, Ruling Halts Picking of Pickle-Pickers' Pockets, Gilroy Dispatch, Apr. 4, 1989.
365. Stockdale, Changing Times in Strawberry Valley, Central Coast, May 1989, at 7, 10 (quot-
ing Patrick Sheehy, partner in Santa Maria Berry Farms).
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